Scheman, Ronald. "Rebuilding the OAS: A Program for its Second Century," Inter-American Review of Bibliography, vol. 28, no. 4, 1989,

The international agenda holds much for an active OAS. Drugs. Environment. Debt. Technology. Refugees. Transportation. Energy. These are all issues beyond the control of any individual nation. Their impact crosses all national frontiers. They are, by definition, Inter-American issues. They are -by definition- the OAS. There are several ways in which the OAS can begin to deal with them more effectively.

First, we must separate the political and development agendas. They are governed by entirely different criteria. A serious development agenda requires analysis and decisions on development issues by experts in each field. The delegations to the OAS in Washington are not prepared to deal with them. We must get the real experts, the active forces within each nation, to deal with them. The US could set the example for the nations with one significant action. Let AID assume the portfolio of representation before the Inter-American development councils. AID officials are professionally deeply involved in the process of development and are accustomed to managing money.

Second, the OAS has tried to be a multi-functional agency serving all development needs. It does not work -either from a budgetary or staffing point of view. We must separate the development agenda to focus on specific issues and make it easier for the real actors to get involved. This means involving more than government officials, to include private sector, labor groups, educators and civic leaders.

There is no reason why the OAS cannot devise procedures to allow mixed working groups of public and private sector entities to make recommendations to its governing bodies. More important, by involving diverse sectors of the societies, the OAS will build an understanding and a constituency; it will involve people who know what they are talking about and who will be pleased at the opportunity to register their views with their governments. This is participation. It will make the OAS relevant. It will get results.

Third, we should consider moving part of the development activities of the OAS to new headquarters in Latin America or the Caribbean (Kingston, Caracas, San José, Quito).

Viron Vaky considers that today there is a uniquely auspicious climate for hemispheric cooperation, that presents a historic -but passing- opportunity to revitalize the OAS. While the particular circumstances for which the Organization was originally created have changed over time, its underlying raison d’etre has remained powerful. It is still the only place where all the countries of the hemisphere can meet with a regional focus on regional policy and mutual problems and none of the myriad other organizations and subregional arrangements can fully replace it.

International organizations like the OAS and the UN are instruments of the States that formed them. They are neither a deus ex machina nor a self executing mechanism like the World Bank, and therefore can be no more or less than the member States want them to be. It is unrealistic to think that the member States will make huge changes suddenly, sharply transforming both the OAS and the region's dynamics. Pragmatically, the best chance for the development of the OAS lies in incrementalism: small gains, modest shifts in attitude and cumulative processes that add up over time to substantial advances. As the hemisphere nations learn to work with the OAS and channel more and more of their interlocking relationship through it, they will get both experience and reassurance in the process. The OAS could conceivably become a more determinative organization, an agent as well as a product of change.

Throughout the years, the OAS has–cautiously but noticeably–widened agreement as to what principles ought to govern states’ behavior across a range of issues. In that sense, it has become a real source of legitimacy for governments. Consensus building, especially in terms of reinterpreting traditional precepts and legal concepts, promises to be the soundest long-term route to the development of regimes for various issues that cross state borders.

Having made reasonable progress in building consensus, member States are now forced to grapple with the consequences. What is the extent of their collective responsibility to carry out and defend the norms they proclaim? The OAS has, throughout its history, demonstrated some ad hoc capacities for collective action. But today, the need is for much more systematic capabilities. Without further progress in that direction, consensus building risks degenerating into a mere exercise of hortatory rhetoric. Even where there is a broad sharing of basic values and goals, member States still differ among themselves as to just what that means for the OAS in terms of specific roles and functions. A few would prefer that it be little more than a forum for debates and discussion. Others believe that its ability to act as a collective should be carefully circumscribed and controlled by the members. Still others are prepared to vest some power and authority in the Organization to act as the region’s agent for joint management of problems that cannot be handled adequately any other way.

One core task is to reconcile the tension between those who want the OAS to be primarily a means to problem solving and those who stress the application of legal safeguards. A suggestion considering what might be done would be for the Inter-American Juridical Committee to sponsor a long-term policy study of the sovereignty/interdependence, intervention/nonintervention tensions in the 21st. Century, involving political theorists and experts from all over the world. It is striking that so many inquiries into the OAS by US writers and scholars focus on internal structural and procedural reform -or on new programmatic activities- as the key to improving its effectiveness, without any realistic appraisal of the recommendations' prospects and with relatively little attention given to the policies, interests and fears of the individual member States. Usually phrased with hortatory "shoulds" and "musts," such proposals' validity almost always depends on the assumption that all member States see the objective, goal and purpose in the same way, and that it is just a question of the best means. But that is seldom the case.

This is not to disparage recommendations for internal reforms. Streamlining and rationalizing procedures, upgrading the quality and expertise of staffs, and devising imaginative new activities, are all ultimately essential to improved performance. The role of the Secretary General, for example, offers a special potential for generating new ideas, innovative management, and strategies, even though the Charter- and the member States- have placed considerable restraints on what the Secretary General can do.

The point to be emphasized in all this is that reforms follow political consensus. In the words of one scholar, the failures and inadequacies of multilateral institutions, almost always stem from "lack of political consensus and not organizational malfunction" /. It is, in short, political will that produces organizational and programmatic changes, not the other way around.

The variety of special services and assistance provided by a myriad of specialized agencies, committees and commissions suggests a third priority. The governing bodies of the OAS have never decided to what extent they should themselves engage in program execution as distinct from policy guidance, or how much to centralize operations under their direct control or decentralize to specialized entities. Different patterns have been followed by different bodies at different times. A more optimal use of OAS energies would be a "linchpin" concept, that is, decentralizing operational matters (such as technical assistance, narcotics, etc.) to its subsidiary agencies, commissions or committees (such as CICAD, IACHR and PAHO), while the central governing bodies concentrate on overall policy control and coordination. In this concept, the councils and the Secretary General's office would constitute the coordinating hub of a flexible array of decentralized, associated and even independent organizations and cooperative ventures. This linchpin role would be an especially useful way for member governments to ensure coordination among agencies, including those with a global reach, involved in hemispheric affairs.

In the final analysis, the future prospects of the OAS will be shaped, to a substantial degree, by the US. This country cannot by itself make the OAS effective nor determine how the Organization is to function, but no one can dispute that US influence and willingness to use its resources to carry out OAS decisions are essential and would be a powerful catalyst to broader regionwide attempts to collective governance. If the US thinks of the OAS as its alliance and throws its weight around and expects others to accept its schemes and is unwilling to adjust to theirs, then it will resurrect old resentments and it will shatter consensus. If, on the other hand, US policy makers honestly consult and discuss, listen and bargain, convey mutual respect and consideration, the result could be an exemplary regional organization.

There are three sectors in particular in which an effective OAS performance would be very much in the US interests and for which US ideas, influence and support are critical:

Bouncing back from a long period of stagnation and political irrelevance, the OAS is engaged in a process of adapting itself to the post-cold war era.

A new common agenda may already be perceived in the work of the Organization, ranging from the promotion of democracy and human rights, to the control of drug trafficking and environmental protection. But given the convergence of a long-standing tradition of doctrinal support for representative democracy in the Inter-American system with the ascendancy of democratic politics in the region, the process of renewal of the OAS has been characterized by an overriding concern for democratic governance in the Americas. The widely recognized fact that the young democracies are still frail and that democratic rule cannot be taken for granted, has led to an unprecedented effort to deepen and consolidate democratic gains and to discourage and oppose reversals.

The 1990s have demonstrated how difficult it is for an international organization to reverse coups d’etat or breakdowns of democratic rule in sovereign countries. Nevertheless, most countries agree that reacting forcefully against those who would overthrow democratic rule is worth pursuing, even if the desired restoration is not achieved. Such actions could represent something of a deterrent against future conspiracies. At the very least, they would signal a collective will in the Americas to resist the enemies of democracy. In the last analysis, the OAS will be judged by its true ability to act effectively on its doctrinal commitment to the promotion an defense of democracy in the Americas. This will require additional institution building and adequate resources. For example, the Organization requires a cadre of professionals from which it can draw for fact-finding at any time. The UPD might assume that responsibility. As a further step toward implementing the Santiago Commitment, the OAS member States could elevate the unit to under-Secretariat level and provide it with material resources proportional to the magnitude of its tasks.

The process of renewal of the OAS will require the strengthening of the Secretariat to give it a larger, more politically experienced, and better qualified staff. According to one view, the OAS is still "a fundamentally weak organization" in terms of personnel; "its governance leadership, staffing and mandate [must] be substantially strengthened"^/. At the same time, some streamlining in other areas of the Organization, such as technical cooperation will be beneficial.

In order to ensure that the new hemispheric commitment to democracy results in appropriate, effective and sustainable action, the OAS must be strengthened as an institution, and its member States must agree on an operational strategy. Although it must be grounded in a common set of standards, this strategy also needs to be flexible enough to deal with the complexities of each specific case.

While fundamental change is likely to come slowly, there are several important initiatives that can be taken to strengthen the organization in the meantime:

In 1994 the Inter-American Dialogue decided to form a small commission to develop concrete and practical suggestions to improve the OAS. The Commission, formed by ten distinguished leaders of the region, produced a report which was intended to be an "operational memorandum" with immediate, short-term practical effects. Its basic premises were pragmatism, the desirability for quick action and the conviction that it is unrealistic to expect major changes to take place suddenly. As a practical matter, the Commission believed that the best chance to spur the development of the OAS lies in incrementalism, that is, in small gains, modest shifts and cumulative processes that over time can add up to substantial advances. It also recognized that some deeper reforms and changes in the basic instruments of the OAS could be necessary. If so, the recommendations would lay the foundation and would suggest the direction for such deeper study and consideration. The Commission proposed a six-part strategy for institutional change and made various recommendations:

Inter-American Dialogue. The Organization of American States: Advancing Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Commission on the OAS, Washington, D.C. August 1994, 14 p.

The major limitation of the OAS is the member States' failure to find effective ways to involve the real actors in the economic and political life of the hemisphere. To do this, the OAS must break through its restricted access to the countries through the foreign ministries which, in most countries of the Americas, are only peripherally in touch with the real forces moving their societies. Before the OAS is able to assume a serious policy role, the first task facing the leaders of the hemisphere is to think realistically about how the Organization relates to the new forces driving the economies and societies of the Americas.

In this context, Scheman argues that it may be useful to brainstorm about what a viable Inter-American system should be, looking at the following areas:

1. Politics: Today the legislative branch is pivotal to the consolidation of democracy and its ability to address the social development and economic adjustments necessary to build world class countries. The OAS should find ways to involve the legislators in major Inter-American issues and thus establish a new dynamic in the Inter-American system.

3. Finance: Finance in the Inter-American system is now well covered by the lending capacity of the IDB. The Bank, however, could be even more effective if it related better to the normative activities of the OAS in areas where the OAS has traditional strength. These are, for example, modernizing states, strengthening judiciaries and legislative branches and implementing drug programs. Useful patterns of collaboration with the other Inter-American institutions would be invaluable to the Bank in fulfilling its new mandate for social sector reform. One way to accomplish this is for the OAS to form relevant policy-making bodies among the technical ministries responsible for environment, transportation, labor, etc. through the use of Specialized Conferences.

4. Other Inter-American issues:

• Non-governmental organizations: NGOs are as vital to social sector reform as private enterprise is to productive sector reform. The NGOs tap the energy, experience and drive of private citizens on education, health and poverty alleviation just as private enterprise does for technology and production. They frame the public policy dialogue and press for the civil responsibility and accountability that enable democracy to work. The OAS, in collaboration with the IDB, has a great opportunity to actively strengthen civil society throughout the hemisphere by establishing a machinery for them to have a voice in its deliberations and by channeling programs through them in areas such as the environment, education and health.

• Youth programs: An Inter-American Health Corps and an Inter-American Education Corps would mobilize youths and a broad range of specialists. Charging the OAS to mobilize and manage such a program could inject a new and vigorous public image into Inter-American cooperation as well as significantly enhance IDB health and education programs.

In April 1997, the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemispheric Governance issued a report which argued that the OAS is the logical and principal mechanism through which governments can collaboratively engage each other -and civil society- in the management of hemispheric affairs and it should, therefore, constitute the central "hub" of the hemisphere's multilateral networks. Nevertheless, the Group considered that the OAS does not currently have the capacity to play such role, "not for any intrinsic or organic reason, but because of the absence of political consensus among member governments about what the organization should be and what it should do". The report, therefore, posited "the urgent need for a fundamental reassessment by the member States of the role and function of the OAS. The time has come for an inter-governmental, bottoms-up review of the organization. The issues are too pressing and the opportunities too passing to afford the region's nations the luxury of incrementalism." Hence, the Santiago Summit should start an in-depth discussion on the role of the OAS, that is, the chiefs of state should begin a process of consultation at the Santiago meeting, by forming an independent, inter-governmental task force, as their instrument to examine, consult and recommend to them for action proposals for basic changes and reforms which would encourage effective regional governance.

The report made two sets of proposals:

Inter-American Dialogue. The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The OAS, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance, Washington, D.C., April 1997, 35 p.

b. The OAS and the Summit Process: A Central Secretariat should be established within the OAS, and the member States should begin preparing and equipping the organization to perform this function.

c. Internal governance:

* The Deliberative Forum: Despite reforms to the Charter, the basic internal governance structure is still essentially the one created 50 years ago. Hence, there is an urgent need to reassess the fundamentals of this structure, which needs to be "delayered," streamlined and updated. When the General Assembly was created as the "supreme organ," for example, there was no other instrument to bring governments together on regional matters. Today, the institutionalization of summit meetings of heads of state and government is surely as "supreme" as one can get. Thus, the OAS framework should be fitted to the summit process and the concept of the General Assembly and the Permanent Council need to be re-examined:

• General Assembly: Some have suggested that one should conceptually think of the Summits as the ultimate decision-making forum, with the OAS and its framework relating to them as their agent and "between meetings" machinery in the same way the Permanent Council now relates to the General Assembly. Therefore, the purpose and function of General Assemblies would change and could be thought of more as a review mechanism, and might, for example, meet twice a year, for briefer periods, with specific and limited agendas, and with more than Foreign Ministry representation.

Inter-American Dialogue. The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The OAS, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance, Washington, D.C., April 1997, 35 p.

• CIDI: The creation of CIDI implied that it would be the OAS platform for dealing with the economic, environmental, scientific, developmental and other fields subsumed under the "integral development" rubric. Thus, it would be a sort of two-chamber governance- the Permanent Council for political and security matters, and CIDI for social and developmental issues. It is not yet working like that and although the Permanent Council and CIDI are technically co-equal, the Permanent Council remains "more equal than others." Furthermore, as a practical matter, the same member State representatives by and large make up the membership of both Councils on a daily basis. Although it is fair to say that CIDI is still being organized and its scope is being defined, member governments do not as yet seem serious about converting CIDI into an effective governance mechanism for social and economic oversight.

Inter-American Dialogue. The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The OAS, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance, Washington, D.C., April 1997, 35 p.

B) Short term reform: There are also a number of immediate challenges and opportunities confronting the OAS and the member States, which should be faced without delay:

a. Democracy: Defending and promoting democracy entails two distinct kinds of activity:

1) Defending democracy:

a) Crisis management: The report was not in favor of the argument that the OAS should agree in advance to a formula of escalating sanctions in cases of coups. Close consultation should be maintained with the UN and a coordinated division of labor between the two organizations should be explored.

b) Preventive measures, such as electoral observations, reconciliation and dispute settlement, and post-conflict peace-keeping: These activities have been located in the UPD, but are unrelated to its basic mandate, thus blurring its focus and creating confusion about its purposes and priorities. The different roles and functions now lumped together in the UPD should be separated into distinct sub-units, each with a clear purpose and line of authority. To this end, the report recommended the creation of a Political Department within the General Secretariat, perhaps under an Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs to manage and coordinate distinct activities such as:

• A Special Projects Division to provide staff support and management of the political operational programs (demining, monitoring peace arrangements, etc.).
• Election Observation/Monitoring, should be moved to the Political Department as a distinct sub-unit, since it is essentially a political task requiring political legitimacy of the elections observed. Technical assistance to help reform government electoral mechanisms should remain with the UPD as an institution-building activity.
• A Policy Planning Staff should be established to provide the Secretary General and the Permanent Council with a capacity to track developments throughout the hemisphere, identify future trends and problems and supply general analytic and evaluation support for operational decisions.
• The Political Department would also serve as the Executive Secretariat for the Permanent Council, in addition to managing these sub-units.

Inter-American Dialogue. The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The OAS, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance, Washington, D.C., April 1997, 35 p.

b. Human rights: The group argued against the introduction of radical alterations in the institutions and the institutional arrangements of the Inter-American Human Rights System. Its basic design and nature are basically sound. The reforms and changes that may be needed for optimal performance lie in the areas of resources, quality and productivity.

The mayor activity of the IACHR and the Court should be the judicial function of hearing petitions and cases and developing a body of human rights case law. Monitoring and reporting should continue, but with some shift to thematic reporting and analysis. The Commission should shed educational/promotional activities, which can be carried out by other agencies and organizations, so as to concentrate its resources and energies on the judicial and monitoring function which no one else can do. The report also recommended the introduction of organizational and administrative reforms.

c. Security:

a) Measures to deepen the notion of "cooperative security" and confidence building should be continued and intensified.

b) The Defense Ministerial process should be institutionalized, but as part of the OAS framework and of the larger Summit process.

c) The mission, structure and purpose of the existing military organizations (the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College) should be re-examined to make them relevant to regional needs.

d) Internal Public Order:

• CICAD should be expanded into an Inter-American Commission on Crime Problems which would include issues related to narcotics, crime, terrorism and public order.
• Initiate a "Justice Ministerial" process by convening annual meetings of the region's Justice Ministers to exchange experiences, adopt guidelines and seek regional agreements.

d. Economic:

a) Trade: It is necessary to give the OAS responsibility for acting as a permanent secretariat for the FTAA process. Member States should now bend to the task of developing its technical and staffing capacity to do so, seconding personnel to the organization as much as necessary.

Inter-American Dialogue. The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The OAS, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance, Washington, D.C., April 1997, 35 p.

c) Integral Development: The OAS role should be examined in the recommended long-term reassessment review. In the meantime, member States should take the evolution and implementation of the CIDI concepts seriously. It would be helpful to create within the CIDI Secretariat a central core development planning and evaluation staff, as well as geographical "desks" to liaison and interact with the sub-regional economic organizations.

Three main multilateral activities are underway in the hemisphere: the "Summit Process," the "Trade Ministerial Process" and the "Williamsburg Process." All of these have been initiated and directed chiefly by the US. Each is important and promising. Yet, though they are substantially related, there is little connection and coordination among these separate processes. It remains unclear whether the US will be prepared, at some point, to relinquish its dominant role in setting the agenda for and organizing related meetings. For the next Summit, the US and Chile are serving as co-chairs. But this formula is unlikely to help assuage concerns of other hemispheric governments, or do anything to diminish the asymmetry that has long characterized US-Latin American relations.

Further, it is crucial not to confuse constant meetings at various levels with effective multilateralism. Bringing people together -from the non governmental, private or public sectors- certainly has its benefits, but unless the meetings are sharply focused and mutually productive, they are likely to lead to fatigue and some disappointment. Indeed, there are signs that this has already taken place to some extent, especially with smaller states that typically lack the resources to keep up with a frenetic and costly schedule of meetings on a vast array of subjects.

To help make the patterns of region-wide cooperation more rational and effective, what is needed is a genuinely regional organization to play a coordinating function. The OAS is, in theory, the obvious option. Skeptics, of course, will contend, persuasively, that the OAS is far from being equipped for the job, that it remains largely patronage-driven and lacks the necessary credibility and capacity. The problem, however, is that there is no other existing organization that could conceivably play such role. And the question of whether the OAS can, over a period of time, be sufficiently strengthened and successfully adapted for such a coordinating, multilateral function depends ultimately on the will and commitment of its member governments. In the final analysis, it is a matter of accepting shared responsibility to deal collectively with common, underlying problems. The alternative, it seems, is to defer to the United States to set the terms for multilateral interaction, which is bound to be problematic in the long run.

The US should take the lead in having the summit meetings of the hemisphere's democratically elected heads of state gradually integrated with the OAS. The first such meeting in a generation was held in Miami in December 1994, and the next one is scheduled for April 1998 in Santiago, Chile. There is no more effective multilateral engagement than an assembly of heads of state seeking to build a consensus on regional norms, principles and objectives.

It is necessary to develop a decision-making system within regional organizations, so as to find quick solutions to the problems that are faced by the member States and to make the multilateral process more dynamic. Hence the new role of the OAS should be to regulate the procedures for decision making, which should not be subject to the pressure of extra-regional actors as it is the case in bigger organizations like the UN. In the new context of a globalized world, multilateral organizations should redefine their strategies to produce effective results in important areas, or should only act when the actors involved cannot solve the problem through bilateral or regional means. It is necessary for the OAS to adjust to the new political times.

In extreme situations, when diplomatic exercises are replaced by the use of or the threat of the use of force, or when there are different policies and ideas on common issues, it is necessary to change the system so as to adapt it to reality or otherwise to knowingly admit that it will lack any operating capacity. This sort of issue raises doubts with regards to the efficacy of the OAS. Whenever the differences between the US and Latin America are more pronounced, it is difficult to preserve collective action and to have an authentic consultation process. Today, Latin America is in a better position to negotiate. The group of states will not likely accept that a country, acting unilaterally, decides to change the rules of the game. Thus, the OAS serves as a forum of dialogue, harmonization and consensus.

It would be wrong to deny that a revival of the OAS has occurred since the end of the Cold War. Though, during the 1980's, its very existence seemed in doubt, this is no longer the case. The OAS is now accepted as an essential part of the regional architecture of the Western Hemisphere. Since the Miami Summit, however, the OAS (and the overall Inter-American mood) have encountered unexpected turbulence, blunting the reform process undertaken by Secretary General Gaviria and restoring doubts and low expectations of its role. There has been a recent drought of creative initiatives like the Santiago Commitment (Resolution 1080) and a sense of drift in the Permanent Council. Curiously, what is not at stake is a strong consensus among all countries from the Southern Cone to the Arctic Circle, including Washington, on the need for the OAS. Rather, the problem facing the organization as the 1990's draw to a close, is the continuing lack of consensus among the 34 governments on its appropriate role, structure, and authority in a period of increasing interdependence. That the OAS faces an historic debate, is not in doubt. What are the prospects for its emergence from the sidelines to become a significant force in the political integration of the Americas?

From one perspective, since 1990 the OAS has come a long way. In several key agenda areas--such as the promotion of democracy and cooperative security-major advances have been achieved. This incipient OAS strengthening process, however, has already largely stalled in the aftermath of the Miami Summit. Collectively and individually, the advances since 1990 have confirmed the OAS existence, but not decisively reshaped its legitimacy within the Inter-American system. Meanwhile, the post-Miami period illustrates additional complexities.

Second, the Miami Summit marked the end of the general enthusiasm throughout the Americas for NAFTA-accession as the preferred model of hemispheric trade integration while strengthening MERCOSUR as an alternative mechanism for South America. The reasons for this change of approach are complex, as are the long-term implications for multilateralism in the Americas. Fundamental questions are raised by the reality of the US and Brazil as anchor-states of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, respectively. Are the "driving forces of regionalization," so to speak, creating not one, but two economic regions in the Western Hemisphere? Is MERCOSUR more appropriately viewed from a global perspective as a major trade integration bloc in its own right (as is NAFTA), or primarily as a sub-regional building block towards an FTAA? Is the Río Group emerging as a counterpoint to the OAS? Is the vision of Bolívar disputing the Monroe Doctrine? Whatever the answers, the post-Miami Summit era demonstrates an increasing decentralization in the Western Hemisphere which must be accommodated in any optimal architecture for regional governance.

If the OAS is to become the central hub of hemispheric governance, it must perform two essential roles.

First, it must become the "central deliberative forum" through which governments shape a regional consensus on the principal issue-areas confronting them and develop the norms and guidelines for dispute settlement and Inter-American cooperation. Second, the OAS must shake off the dust from previous decades and revitalize its capacity to perform the "central secretariat/clearing house" role required by members for effective inter-action in hemispheric community-building.

Along with the drastic organizational overhaul permitting the OAS to evolve into an effective hub institution in the Americas, certain other requirements would be necessary for its ultimate success. First, the identification of cooperative security as the basis for hemispheric cooperation is of central importance for the future of hemispheric governance. While some authors may exaggerate the degree and permanence of US conversion to this approach, the concept has demonstrated sufficient potential to underscore its continued vitality for community-building. Second, the post-Miami, multi-track processes should be merged under the overall authority of the OAS. Third, the new architecture must accept the reality-and needs-of vastly different sub-regions with approaches that support their differing requirements and global insertion. Finally, the old OAS model, based on narrow inter--tate interaction via Foreign Ministry Ambassadors, must yield to the new realities of multi-sector governance and regionalization from below, requiring the active engagement of Inter-American civil society.

It remains an open question whether such leadership from the US and other key countries will be forthcoming, given the familiar Inter-American tensions and power asymmetry, on the one hand, and widespread domestic political obstacles, on the other. In Washington, the handling of the drug issue, Cuban policy, and the ongoing reluctance to fast-track the trade liberalization process demonstrate a unilateralist reflex which worries US neighbors. The Latin American middle-powers, particularly Brazil and Mexico, retain their historic ambivalence toward an interventionist OAS. For the majority of small states, particularly those in the Caribbean and Central America which confront NAFTA and MERCOSUR, multilateralism is only meaningful if it assists the weak as well as strong. Throughout the region, social sustainability and democratic development loom as major challenges. The initial Latin American optimism of the immediate post-Cold War years is over, and trade liberalization is now viewed as only one of many conditions for a successful transition. Canada remains a true believer in regional multilateralism, but is having to adjust its sights downwards, in view of the intractable realities of this complex region.

The Stanley Foundation.

In October 1997, the Stanley Foundation brought together a group of scholars and practitioners to discuss prospects for building multilateral cooperation between the US and Latin America. One of the questions that was raised was whether the OAS is underutilized because it is unworkable or the reverse.

The OAS, states the report, is the only forum to which all the region's governments belong and where all can come together on an equal footing. As an existing body, it has an infrastructure already in place. For these reasons, it is the most likely candidate for locating future collaborative efforts.

Despite these problems, most members of the group felt that it is better to work to strengthen and restructure the OAS as a forum for multilateral cooperation rather than try to construct a new organization. They argued that the US, with some urgency, should join with other governments to reform the OAS to enable it to better perform two related but distinct roles:

1. a deliberating forum where governments regularly come together to consult one another, air disputes and establish norms and principles;
2. a mechanism to provide the basic staffing services, information, coordination, and clearing house functions that governments need to carry out decisions.

Some felt the first or policy function should be focused on political matters, leaving economic matters to global and bilateral agreements. There was agreement that the second or secretariat function could be carried out either centrally or through an array of specialized agencies such as the IDB, CICAD or PAHO.

With regards to the Summit Process, a majority -but not all- of the members of the group, agreed that the process that began in Miami in 1994 and to be continued in Santiago in 1998, should be institutionalized in a system of periodic summits. However, they also agreed, that to realize its potential fully, the hemispheric summit process now needs to be institutionalized, connected to other regional institutions, and deliberately transformed into the primary instrument of hemispheric cooperation.

The Stanley Foundation.

Building Multilateral Cooperation in the Americas: A New Direction for US Policy, Report of the Thirty-Eighth Strategy for Peace, US Foreign Policy Conference, October 23-25, 1997, 19 p.

Noting that Chile has asked the OAS to serve as the "institutional memory" of the 1998 summit, some participants recommended that the central secretariat function of the summit process be established within the OAS and that its member States begin to prepare and equip the organization to fulfill its role. Others questioned whether the OAS, even with changes to ensure direct ties to capitals, could be relied upon to manage the summit process.

The group also felt that major multilateral institutions, including the IDB, the World Bank, PAHO and the UN system, as well as the OAS, should be used more actively to exchange information and experiences in specific areas such as health and education, with an eye ultimately to developing broader regional reforms.

This report highlights the need for stronger multilateral institutions to manage and advance the growing cooperation in Inter-American affairs, and urges all governments to assign high priority to restructuring and adapting the OAS to the needs of an increasingly interdependent hemisphere, as well as to integrate the OAS and the presidential summits.

The opportunity to build strong and productive hemispheric partnerships must be grasped soon, otherwise it will fade. Progress is needed on three fronts to assure the future of hemispheric cooperation:

• Within individual nations, the challenges are to strengthen democratic practice, improve economic performance and, most of all, raise the living standards of all citizens.
• In hemispheric affairs, the U.S. and other governments must turn their verbal commitments into consistent national policies that foster political cooperation and economic integration.

• Multilaterally, stronger rules and institutions are required to consolidate, deepen, and sustain cooperation in the hemisphere. The OAS should be restructured and adapted to the changing needs of hemispheric relations.

Following are some of the points discussed in the report:

The Pace of Integration Slows: In the two and a half years since the Miami Summit, progress towards building a more politically cooperative and economically integrated hemisphere has been uneven. To be sure, governments and private organizations in the hemisphere collaborate on many issues. Multilateral efforts prevented a military takeover in Paraguay and restored peace between Peru and Ecuador. OAS monitors helped to assure the fairness of presidential elections in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. Subregional cooperation has been even more vigorous. The presidents of Central America have initiated regular (twice-yearly) meetings to review common problems and set courses of action. The four Mercosur nations have strengthened their economic and trade group, and incorporated Chile and Bolivia as associate members. Despite a number of specific disputes, the three NAFTA partners continue to implement their agreement.

The governments have established working groups on all the key trade issues. With the assistance of several regional agencies, these groups have made important technical progress on the free trade agenda. Ministers of defense from countries throughout the hemisphere have assembled twice, to explore ways to improve Inter-American collaboration on security matters. New treaties have been signed to combat money laundering and corruption. At the same time, however, confidence in the future of hemispheric cooperation has diminished. Progress toward hemisphere-wide free trade has been slower than expected. Despite the election in 1994 of a highly regarded new Secretary-General, the OAS has not gained significantly in stature or credibility. Most nations remain opposed to expanding its financing or mandate, or making necessary changes in its structure and operations.

The report claims that in the area of economic integration, a permanent secretariat is needed to support negotiations toward a free trade agreement. The secretariat, which could be associated with a strengthened OAS, is already needed as an independent source of information, technical analysis and expert advice (particularly for the hemisphere's smaller economies) as well as a coordinator of schedules and logistics. As negotiations proceed, these tasks will become increasingly complex, and the need for a competent secretariat even greater.

OAS Reform: A number of governments oppose efforts to reform the OAS, and expand its role in hemispheric affairs. Reflecting, in part, Latin American and Caribbean concerns about the potential U.S. dominance of a more robust OAS, some nations are prepared to restrict the institution's mandate, tolerate mediocre performance, and keep the Organization away from major issues.

Latin American governments, for example, have resisted efforts to make the OAS's Democracy Unit a more forceful instrument for democratic change. Proposals to bolster the Inter-American Commission and the Court of Human Rights by expanding their authority, upgrading staff, and improving procedures have languished. Some countries would like to constrain these institutions further. There is little interest in Latin America and the Caribbean to take advantage of post-Cold War opportunities to revamp hemispheric security relations.

Inter-American Dialogue. The Americas in 1997: Making Cooperation Work, A Report of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum, Inter-American Dialogue, May 1997, 41 p.

Summit Process: The U.S. government should take the lead to have the summit implementation and planning process (and related activities like the meetings of the hemisphere's defense ministers and the FTAA deliberations) gradually integrated with the OAS. Summit meetings of the hemisphere's presidents and prime ministers are a powerful basis for Inter-American cooperation.

Multilateral Institutions: The governments of the hemisphere should give high priority to strengthening the capacity and expanding the mandates of key Inter-American institutions, especially the OAS. Stronger and more active multilateral institutions will be required to manage sustained political and economic cooperation in the hemisphere. Institutional creation and renovation, from APEC, OECD, and NATO to reform of the UN, are hallmarks of a world increasingly challenged by transnational issues.

The problems and weaknesses of the OAS are serious, and stand in the way of genuine multilateral cooperation in the hemisphere. In good measure, they reflect the absence of political consensus among member governments about what the OAS should be and what it should do. Forging that consensus is a crucial challenge for all governments of the Americas.

The OAS along with the IDB, are the logical mechanisms through which governments should engage each other in the management of hemisphere affairs. Other regional arrangements, like the FTAA process, the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG), and the Rio Group, for example, are making valuable contributions. The OAS, however, is the only forum where all governments regularly come together to address the full range of regional issues. The OAS provides the infrastructure and machinery for cooperative effort. It is up to the governments to make good use of them. The OAS does not have the capacity today to assume a central role in the design and management of the presidential summits or the hemispheric free trade negotiations. Member governments should, however, recognize the desirability of having a reformed and revitalized OAS that could eventually assume these responsibilities.