FROM CARTAGENA FORWARD

VI SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

CARTAGENA - COLOMBIA

2012
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Introduction - Sherry Tross
Executive Secretary, Summits of the Americas Secretariat
Organization of American States

When the region’s Heads of State and Government met in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, for the Sixth Summit of the Americas, on April 14-15, 2012, they tackled a full menu of issues of critical importance on which they could work together to benefit the nations and peoples of the Western Hemisphere. With the agreed-upon thematic focus of “Connecting the Americas: Partners for Prosperity,” the region’s elected leaders established specific mandates in five areas: poverty elimination, infrastructure, citizen security and transnational organized crime, access to technology, and disaster risk prevention and mitigation.

These mandates, adopted at the highest levels, provide the policy framework for implementation of Sixth Summit commitments and a road map for action. This follow-through and implementation aspect provides the critical underpinning for the Summit process, namely the conversion of policy decisions into concrete action to benefit the peoples of the Americas.

Both in its preparation and execution, the Sixth Summit deliberately sought to place significant emphasis on action and on partnership. This premise is reflected in the inaugural speeches, as well as in the essays from institutional partners and social actors included in this volume.

While the essays underscore the scope of the challenges facing the Americas, the authors also remind us that this region has a wealth of knowledge, capacity, and resources that can be more optimally utilized to achieve concrete and measurable results.

The essays by leaders of 11 international institutions that are members of the Joint Summit Working Group inherently reaffirm the importance of cross-sector collaboration in problem-solving. This could mean, for example, using information and communication technologies to improve access to health services or strengthening rural development as part of a comprehensive effort to address poverty and inequality.

Indeed, working in partnership with the region’s governments and with civil society, the international institutions that comprise the Joint Summit Working Group play an important role in propelling action based on the decisions taken at the highest political level. In the months and years ahead, their role will be integral to the follow-up and implementation of the Cartagena mandates.

The Sixth Summit of the Americas will also likely be remembered for an unprecedented level of rigorous debate, including on political issues that had not been discussed as prominently at previous gatherings. In a nod to the broadened discussion, this publication also includes social actor/nongovernmental perspectives on two of the more controversial issues that arose during the Sixth Summit—the debate over the so-called war on drugs and the potential participation of Cuba in future Summits.

1 Sherry Tross served as Executive Secretary of the Summits of the Americas Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS) from December 2010 to November 2012.
In Cartagena, President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia underscored the importance of “specific, feasible, and measurable actions” that benefit the people of the Americas. “The presidents and heads of government have NOT come to this Summit to comment on reality; we have come to transform it,” he said in his opening remarks.

Transformation is never easy, and formidable challenges lie ahead. The path forward will be stakeholder-driven. As these pages remind us, the essential work of Summit implementation requires the commitment of all stakeholders if desired results are to be achieved in energy sustainability, investment and innovation, technology, youth employment and training, women’s entrepreneurship, and citizen security, among other priority areas. It is up to all of us—nations, institutions, citizens—to ensure that these important goals become reality.

Chapter I
Sixth Summit Opening Speeches
Remarks by

Juan Manuel Santos
President of Colombia

Opening of the Sixth Summit of the Americas

Welcome, presidents and heads of government of the American nations, to the Sixth Summit of the Americas, to Colombia, and to this historic city of Cartagena de Indias!

Around this table we have the rich diversity of our peoples: different cultures, languages, races, environments, histories, and paths.

At the same time, beyond these differences, we are unified by the singular character, the exceptional nature, of a hemisphere that contrasts with an uncertain and perilous world.

Here we have democracy, here we have peace among nations, here we have growth. Here we do not have irreconcilable rivalries or irrational extremisms. That is the foundation of our unity and our potential.

Upon that reality we can connect the Americas, build the bridges of unity we need to arrive at a shared vision of the future. This is not the rhetorical idealism of the past.

We face the unavoidable need to act together to be more effective in resolving the many challenges that still affect the welfare, tranquility, and prosperity of our peoples, to whom our deliberations are truly addressed.

The Americas are again the “New World,” that hemisphere that opened some unsuspected possibilities and horizons for humanity, a decisive force that can effectively impact the evolution of global affairs.

In our multipolar world, hemispheric and regional cohesion is decisive in a genuine conversation, in asserting our aspirations and the voice of our people. The old stereotype, in which some of us are from the south and others are from the north, is obsolete. Here we are all equal, if we want to make an impact.

Today I’d like to propose that we use this Summit to make this “the moment of the Americas.”

A moment in which our hemisphere emerges as a regional bloc with fundamental points of consensus for the prosperity and well-being of our peoples. Now it is truly possible.

First, because Latin America and the Caribbean have left behind many of the structural and institutional weaknesses that kept us tied to the past.

Secondly, because the traditional powers—among them our friend and neighbor, the United States—have already experienced the limits of the isolated exercise of power; they have learned that they alone cannot carry all the weight of maintaining balance and peace in the world.

As for Latin America, we have moved from being a problem region—tormented by economic crises and dictatorships—to being a source of responses and solutions to present-day challenges.

Our economies, for the most part, are growing more quickly than the world average, with low inflation, fiscal responsibility, and a solid external sector.

Our region has carried out the necessary economic reforms to ensure sustainable growth and stability.

Latin America has adapted to globalization by generating appropriate conditions, for example, to attract foreign investment.

All of this in a political context in which respect for fundamental rights and public freedoms prevail.

The region also has attached high priority to addressing poverty, investing significant resources in improving the quality of life of the most underdeveloped sectors. Forty million Latin Americans have emerged from poverty in the past decade.

Latin America, as a whole, now has a more genuine and effective institutional framework for decision-making, built not to divide, not to exclude, but to be more consistent and united.

Today, practically all the countries are united by various agreements that facilitate increasing flows of goods and services in the region and the hemisphere.

Latin America is privileged in terms of natural resources: we have great energy surpluses, close to a quarter of the world’s arable land, and a third of its fresh water. Our soil supports the greatest biological diversity on the planet.

This blessed geography gives us the muscle and authority to exert constructive influence on the discussion of international affairs.

And there is another highly important social aspect that now, more than ever, enhances opportunities to work together, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.

Just as migrants from the Old World contributed to the development of North America and generated solid ties of friendship and solidarity with Europe, we are sure that today, when Hispanics are already the largest minority group in the United States—50 million inhabitants—their efforts, their struggle, their contributions will also establish ties and brotherhood throughout the hemisphere.

In short, it is evident, it is clear, that there has been no better moment in history to build bridges in the hemisphere and to take advantage of these and many other possibilities I have mentioned.

Without a doubt, it is also a matter of efficacy. We all know that many of the problems that dog us are shared problems.

On behalf of our people, we have the responsibility to take the most practical and effective path toward resolving those problems and challenges.

There is only one: it is the path of joining forces, of connecting our priorities, of having a specific shared agenda that will enhance collective action.
This Summit is the right place for moving in that direction. Because there is the risk—let’s be frank—that we will be content simply with words, as often happens at so many summits.

Or that we will spend our time speaking for the record and to those at home, rather than taking the opportunity for dialogue, here, with each other.

The presidents and heads of government have NOT come to this Summit to comment on reality; we have come to transform it.

The nature of the challenges we face in the political, economic, environmental, and security arenas gives us no choice but to work hand in hand.

We must identify specific, feasible, and measurable actions that have funding and that, above all, will reach all the citizens of our hemisphere.

May our good intentions not stop there—at good intentions—but become a palpable reality for our peoples.

The countries of Latin America are at a genuine turning point.

We have the chance to take a qualitative leap in our own development, and also to take a leap in our relations with the world, a chance we must not squander.

To meet that aim, we must unseat myths and prejudices, overthrow stereotypes, and leave behind anachronistic ideological ties. It’s a question of approaching the future of the hemisphere with a new paradigm: a paradigm in which what is most important is the interest of the people, the rights of the people.

Let this be our paradigm! The interests of the people, the interests of over 930 million people who inhabit this hemisphere and who have the right, every right, to dream of a decent life, with equality, with justice, with development and peace.

To serve the people of the Americas we must commit ourselves to rethinking relations between Latin America and North America.

It is time to discard the stereotypes of the past, like that of Latin America as a problem region or the United States as an imperialistic power.

We must build physical bridges—and many are needed—but the most important bridges are political, economic, and social.

The countries to the south of the Rio Grande buy from the United States close to a quarter of its exports and provide it a fifth of its imports.

Bilateral trade between the United States and the region last year exceeded 800 billion dollars. This figure far exceeds, for example, trade between the United States and China, which was 500 billion dollars.

Canada, for its part, has more free trade agreements with countries of Latin America and the Caribbean than with all the rest of the world, and is an investor—hear this—in two of every three mining projects in the region.

There is no doubt, then, as to the profound economic interdependence that provides a very good basis for building the future. We are already partners in commerce, already partners in investment.

At this Summit, we can decide also to be partners in democratic prosperity and well-being. Realpolitik, with its cold calculations focusing on the interests of the state, may be effective—we don’t doubt it—but we must always remember that it needs principles in order to be sustainable.

So, in today’s world, we need a new paradigm that acknowledges that, in order to be effective, we need each other.

We need a sort of “pragmatism with principles,” a concept I heard spoken of once by the Secretary General of the United Nations and, more recently, by the Secretary of State of the United States, Hillary Clinton, in a speech at Georgetown University.

And at the risk of seeming naïve, that new paradigm is based on an attitude that seems simple but is something we need: efficacy.

It is a matter of building bridges, of recognizing the aspirations and fears of the other, of connecting politically on the basis of solidarity, seeking that unexpected creative angle, capable of unleashing dynamics that can resolve problems and shorten distances.

And I say so from experience, because along that avenue we have successfully approached challenges that seemed insurmountable.

Who could have imagined two years ago, after so much tension and discord, that Venezuela and Colombia would fully restore their relations and their friendship as good neighbors?

Who thought that our two countries, with such different visions, could conduct a concerted diplomatic effort to facilitate the restoration of normal institutional and democratic life in Honduras?

By building bridges, everything is possible.

As President of Colombia, and as host of this conference, I want to invite you to build bridges, bridges guided by our principles, always seeking effectiveness.

Just as the example of Venezuela and Colombia well illustrates the power and magic of seeking solutions through respect for differences, through cooperation and solidarity, other cases exemplify all the frustrations that result from a lack of concerted effort, a lack of effective bridges among us.

I refer to a matter close to my heart, the tragedy of Haiti. Observing what has happened there in the past decade, we find that every country cooperates in its own way with Haiti, and cooperates according to its own interests, creating a cacophony of good intentions and poor results.

Moreover, amid all that good will, what was most important was missing: knowing what the Haitian people really want and need.

Instead of promoting our own agendas, we should adopt the agenda of the country itself, of its own government, which knows better than any of us the urgent needs of its people. We must not come to the next Summit invoking hemispheric spirit if we are not first able to contribute, collectively, to Haiti’s vigorous emergence from poverty, through the path of growth.

Another example of the consequences of not moving beyond old paradigms—the lack of bridges and creativity—is the case of Cuba.

Isolation, the embargo, indifference, looking the other way, have already proven ineffective. In today’s world, that path is not justified. It is an anachronism tying us to a Cold War era that ended decades ago.

Just as another hemispheric summit with a prostrate Haiti would be unacceptable, the absence of Cuba would be unacceptable as well. We cannot remain indifferent to a process of change within Cuba that is ever more broadly recognized, and that change must continue.
It is time to overcome the paralysis of ideological stubbornness and seek minimum points of consensus to guide that process of change to a good outcome. For whose benefit? The benefit of the Cuban people. And for that we must build bridges.

Another example is the situation of Central America, so severely thrashed by organized crime that jeopardizes the very stability of those nations and the region.

The responsibility falls to us—their neighbors—especially to their closest neighbors, such as Mexico, Colombia and the United States—we who have already made immense sacrifices in fighting narco-trafficking—to offer formulas to help overcome this grave security crisis. Central America is not alone.

We must not come to the next Summit without decisive victories showing that we will free the Central American peoples from the grip of violence.

And let me mention also the case of my own country.

As you all know, Colombia has been in an intolerable conflict for over half a century, the longest-running internal conflict of the present day. Recently, we have made unprecedented progress toward resolving this conflict.

And we will continue doing so, not only with a firm security policy but also by addressing all the other circumstances that have helped to keep it alive: rural development and unemployment; displaced persons dispossessed of their lands and victims’ reparations; illegal crops and narco-trafficking; and a weak institutional presence in a significant part of our territory.

We are convinced that, with these policies, we are building the true conditions for a lasting peace.

And regardless of the intent of those who commit violence, we will reach peace, through our determination and our progressive agenda.

And when I see that the minimum guarantees are in place for a credible and realistic conflict resolution process, I will not hesitate to launch it.

Lastly, there is another topic on which it would be wise to review the paradigms. There is one in particular.

I speak of the War on Drugs, which President Nixon declared in 1971, and which actually has lasted more than 100 years, since the International Opium Convention was signed in 1912.

Today, a century later, it would be wiser to stop and evaluate this approach, to simply determine where we are and where we are going.

Despite all the immense efforts and immense costs, we must recognize that the illegal drug trade continues in full force, drug addiction in the great majority of countries is a serious public health problem, and narco-trafficking is the principal funding source for violence and terrorism.

Colombia, like many other countries of the region, believes that we must initiate a discussion and analysis on this topic, without prejudice or dogma, that considers various scenarios and possible alternatives for addressing this challenge more effectively.

This should be an open discussion, without ideological or political slants, a rigorous, evidence-based examination of the costs and benefits of each alternative. Of course, this discussion must not be used as an excuse to not do what we all know is indispensable: to firmly, vigorously, and unceasingly fight organized crime.

And it should be a discussion, of course, focused on people, on the victims of this business. The victims are consumers, drug addicts; the victims are those who suffer from the violence that narco-trafficking generates; the victims are the millions of prison inmates in the world; the victims are citizens who suffer the effects of corruption; and, of course, the victims are the dead—so many dead!—killed in this business and in the fight against it.

This Summit will not resolve this issue, of course, but it can serve as a starting point for a discussion we have been postponing for too long.

I have spoken of the region’s propitious moment, and of great possibilities in the hemisphere. But we all know that on some great challenges, and on many fronts of collective action, we have failed to make progress.

At this Sixth Summit, we have chosen five challenges, all highly important, to examine in seeking our path toward this joint effort.

We seek to connect the Americas, so that our nations will be true partners in prosperity.

This means working, with the support of multilateral institutions, to develop programs and projects for physical infrastructure and electrical interconnection to integrate the Americas.

This also means promoting joint initiatives to increase our peoples’ access to the advantages of technology and communications.

We are also talking about establishing appropriate coordination to prevent and respond to natural disasters, which are increasingly frequent and devastating, including those caused by climate change.

Right here in Colombia, we have suffered and continue to suffer. Almost half of my country is flooded—the severest wave of winter weather in our history, with millions of people affected.

No one can deny the reality of climate change and the urgent need to prepare to face it and mitigate its effects.

Another essential topic is public security, which the inhabitants of the Americas see as one of their greatest problems.

There is a lot we can do together to prevent and fight violence, corruption, and organized crime, and Colombia has much to offer in this area, where we have made progress and learned lessons.

Finally, the essential priority topic of reducing poverty and inequality should also be on our table.

It is remarkable that, between 2001 and 2010, poverty in Latin America declined from 44 to 31 percent.

But these improvements, as important as they are, are not enough.

All of our efforts should be directed, as a matter of priority, to turning economic prosperity into social prosperity. Here the conclusions of the social actors forum held at the same time as this Summit are very valuable.

And speaking of economic prosperity, let me stress that this week, for the first time, we had a simultaneous summit of business leaders of the hemisphere, which brought together the primary private-sector leaders of the Americas.

It was a summit which not only discussed business, opportunities, and investment, but also explored making private initiative a central participant in job creation and a partner in eliminating inequality.
Because there is no point to growth, there is no point to macroeconomic stability and free trade, if it all fails to narrow social gaps and provide more opportunities for income, for employment, and for a better quality of life for our peoples.

Let us never forget that this Summit involves not only governments, not only political interests: IT INVOLVES PEOPLE, people with needs, some of them urgent, people who demand our effective and coordinated action.

So here we have the major challenges of this Summit.

We must face them with a sense of American solidarity and humanity. Because only working hand in hand, only by changing the paradigms, can we build a better world for all.

I invite us to build bridges.

I invite us to be partners in prosperity.

To be partners for our people.

And I invite us to hear what this little girl said, what a little hummingbird told us, and told me: BEING MORE UNITED, WE WILL BE A BETTER AMERICA!

Thank you very much.
impact of global warming, which has led once-sporadic climate-related disasters to become frequent events in our regions.

The basis for our common action is solid. Today, our countries are open to the world in a greater variety of ways. However, much of our trade remains confined to our hemisphere and its subregions. The eight largest economies in Latin America are among the United States’ top 30 trading partners, all with more or less balanced trade figures. They are all also among the principal importers of North American products. Added to that is the rising prominence of North America-to-South foreign direct investment (and investment in the opposite direction is also at record levels); the strong trade in services; and the fact that Canada and Latin America supply most of the strategic and energy products imported by the United States.

However, our economies, which are more closely tied than some believe, are not the only concern. There is also the issue of our people, who emigrate at a higher rate than the rest of the world’s population, particularly within their own region; 15 percent of the population of North America are of Latin or Caribbean origin, and the number of children born in the United States with those backgrounds comprise 25 percent of the total.

There is also a question of values. This hemisphere and Europe are the world’s two democratic regions. No one attending this Summit owes their presence here to anyone but their people, who elected them. Of course, our democracies are not perfect; far from it. But, look at how far this region has come in recent decades! Surely that is reason enough for our countries to continue to work together to meet the commitments to their citizens undertaken when they signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

Over the past decade the region’s countries have become more self-sufficient. Therefore, for hemispheric relations to be to the mutual satisfaction of all, we should all share our responsibilities on an equal footing. Our basic documents present us with a dilemma: on one hand, the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims the inclusion in our system of all the countries of the Americas; the Inter-American Democratic Charter, on the other hand, a document that represents the greatest political breakthrough in recent decades, enshrines our common commitment to democracy—not only its basis, but also its exercise—with full observance of human rights, including civil, political, and social rights.

Democracy is moving forward in the Americas, and the best way to strengthen it is not through external pressure, imposition, or exclusion. The solution to our dilemma between inclusion and democracy lies in dialogue, cooperation, and tolerance.

Within this framework, the reality of a united Americas region is possible; we have undeniable institutional strengths that will assist in achieving our common goals. But the Americas are also made up of regions. That is why hemispheric action is more likely to succeed if it acknowledges the regional realities of North America, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America, as well as the institutions that have arisen to express those realities. The OAS and the inter-American system are not in competition with regional organizations or with any of the forums that have emerged to give voice to our growing desire for integration; on the contrary, it welcomes them.

We should work together in a framework of tolerance and dialogue to realize the prosperity that today is within our reach. The population of the Americas is approaching one billion. Those people hope for a clear message of unity from their leaders gathered here in Cartagena, in order to strengthen our competitiveness and trade; defeat poverty, discrimination, and inequality; protect the human rights of all our citizens; safeguard their security; and make possible the free and democratic society that they demand.

Remarks by Alicia Bárcena
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations
Opening of the Sixth Summit of the Americas

The central theme chosen by the government of Colombia, “Connecting the Americas: Partners for Prosperity,” is a very fitting one, with the focus on poverty reduction, promoting closer physical integration, access to, and use of, technologies, disaster preparedness and management, and citizen security.

This year marks 30 years since the dramatic debt crisis which plunged our continent into the lost decade of the 1980s. Today, the region is an example of how a severe global recession can be weathered with resilience both economically and socially. We have learned to be prudent in the macroeconomic sphere and progressive in the social sphere, applying different countercyclical measures, moderate and short-term as well as structural, and these have enabled us, especially in the past decade, to avoid irreversible social costs.

In recent years, despite the 2008 financial crisis, growth in the region had been at a historic high and Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a boom, the likes of which had not been seen for more than four decades. While growth is expected to slow to 3.7 percent in 2012, down from 4.3 percent in 2011, this indicator will be above the international average. The major strengths continue to be control of inflation (at 6.6 percent), sound fiscal policies, a lower and better structured public debt (below 35 percent of GDP), and unprecedentedly high international reserves (in excess of US$765 billion).

In the past two decades, thanks to decisive action by states, the percentage of poor people in the region declined from 48.4 percent (1990) to 30.4 percent (2011). Extreme poverty or indigence fell by almost 10 percentage points, from 22.6 percent to 12.8 percent of the population over the same period. Employment increased and also improved qualitatively. Unemployment is now below the pre-crisis level (6.6 percent).

This is not all: there have also been unprecedented improvements in income distribution thanks to a better apportionment of labor income and to redistribution policies. For the first time in history, inequality has been reduced, and the Gini coefficient has improved in 18 countries.

We can safely say that since 1994, when the first Summit of the Americas was held, not only has the hemisphere changed, but the world is no longer the same.
By 2016, the emerging economies, whose weight has been increasing steadily, will account for 53 percent of world GDP.

The geographical shift that has been taking place in the world economy forces us to rethink the structure of strategic alliances and to recognize the growing importance of South-South relationships. The sum of economic activity in Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 60 percent of world economic growth. This trend suggests that by 2020 South-South exports will exceed North-North exports. A similar pattern is emerging with foreign direct investment flows, 50 percent of which are channeled towards the developing economies.

One point is clear: the South is no longer the same and the Latin American and Caribbean region has changed as well.

The United States may remain the leading investor in the region, ahead of Spain and China, but following in fourth place are the trans-Latinos of Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and Argentina, which, admittedly, concentrate the bulk of their investments in neighboring countries and in industrial and service sectors, where job creation is highest.

As stated in our document Time for Equality, we are convinced that there are gaps to be closed and trails to be opened up, because inequality conspires against development and security. Our region can grow more and better. The paradigm today is ensuring equality for growth and growth for equality. The key to closing social gaps is employment with rights, and this means closing production gaps not only between sectors but also between territorial divisions.

The size of companies and the way they fit into the production chain matter. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises generate 60 percent of jobs but account for only 25 percent of GDP. Moving towards productive convergence will depend on success in closing gaps in productivity, innovation, investment, and infrastructure. ECLAC advocates a structural shift underpinned by active industrial and technological policies, in tandem with inclusive financing strategies. It will be crucial to avoid “reprimarization” of some economies and to ensure that windfall earnings from the natural resources exported by the region are administered judiciously, in keeping with a vision for the future and the principles of environmental sustainability.

Territory does matter. While the countries in the region are well on the way to achieving many of the Millennium Development Goals, national averages mask lags and setbacks at the subnational or local level. Hence the urgency to address territorial heterogeneity within countries and especially between urban and rural areas.

Two significant gaps that must be closed are the gaps in investment and intraregional trade. Investment levels in the region now stand at 20 percent of GDP. By contrast, in Asia-Pacific, investments are of the order of 40 percent. Intraregional trade represents just 19 percent, compared with as much as 48 percent in Asia-Pacific and 54 percent in Europe.

Infrastructure matters too. There is sufficient evidence of the virtuous relationship that exists between economic and social development and greater availability and quality of infrastructure services (including telecommunications, road and rail networks, ports, airports, power generation, transmission and distribution, transport and marketing of hydrocarbons, and drinking water and sanitation services).

This is conducive to greater factor productivity and lower production costs. Those countries where proper infrastructure is available record higher per capita GDP and less inequality.

In order to close the gap during the period 2006-2020, Latin America and the Caribbean will need to invest approximately 5.2 percent of GDP in communications, energy, transport, and water and sanitation. If we hope to achieve the levels of the South-East Asian countries, the investment will have to be of the order of 7.9 percent of GDP. Currently, 30 million people in the region do not have access to electricity.

One specific area in which advances can be made is telecommunications. While the region has made some headway, broadband Internet penetration is still much lower than in the developed countries or in the rapidly growing Asian economies. In Latin America and the Caribbean, broadband is still expensive, slow, of poor quality, and out of reach for broad segments of the population. Only 5 percent have access to Internet at a cost of US$25 per MBS, whereas in Europe, the cost is just $5.

Acting as technical secretariat, ECLAC has helped to promote the Regional Dialogue on Broadband, in which 10 countries in the region have been participating actively. And there have been concrete achievements: in a matter of two years, public broadband rates have been halved. The focus for now is on obtaining better quality service and lowering costs by reducing the use of international links, which account for between 20 percent and 40 percent of these costs.

Cooperation is vital for managing, and mitigating the impact of, natural disasters. In the past decade, more than 50 million people have been affected by such events and material losses were over US$115 billion, more than double that of the previous decade. And if we take Haiti into account, more than 230,000 lives were lost.

The region must take advantage of the opportunity provided by the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) to agree on an agenda for sustainable development.

A productive economic development strategy based on equality calls for a new state-market-society equation, and this is what we are building in Latin America and the Caribbean.

We know that there is no single route to achieving this goal. Today our region is opting for diversity and for mutual respect for the balance between state, market, and society that each country judges to be most efficient for fulfillment of its national objectives.

Today’s challenges transcend national boundaries. Canada, the United States of America, and Latin America and the Caribbean share responsibility for the progress and well-being of the peoples of the Americas.

Since the last Summit of the Americas, held in Port of Spain in 2009, there has been a new development of the utmost political importance. I refer to the establishment in Caracas of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

ECLAC views the establishment of CELAC as a historic event of the greatest significance, the objective being to change the way we relate to each other and to the rest of the world with pragmatism and idealism. As stated in the Caracas Declaration, we are convinced “that the unity and political, economic, social and cultural integration of Latin America and the Caribbean constitute both a fundamental aspiration of the peoples represented here, and a requirement for the Region to successfully confront the challenges before us.”
All stakeholders agree on the value of this hemispheric dialogue between the Americas (of the North, Central, and South), as witness the strong attendance by Heads of State and Government here today. For this dialogue to gain strength, however, and if we can plan on its continuing in future decades, this new reality must be taken into account so that all the countries of the hemisphere and all CELAC member countries participate in the next Summit of the Americas.

Being partners for prosperity means recognizing that we are equals but respectful of the differences that we perceive in each other; it means recognizing that we have shared but differentiated responsibilities in building this prosperity.

It means wanting to live together and accepting our geographic proximity as an opportunity not as an affliction. It means seeking among us all our shared truth.

To quote the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, “let’s not say that we will reach agreement once we have found the truth. Let’s say we have found the truth when we have reached agreement.”

Prospering together is, in the final analysis, making a new covenant, a new partnership. Let us turn our word into reality for our peoples.

We at ECLAC are at the disposal of the Summit of the Americas process and are committed to contributing to the prosperity of our peoples.

Chapter II
From Comprehensive Dialogue to Concrete Action
From Cartagena Forward

Integration of Physical Infrastructure

Investing in Infrastructure

Luis Alberto Moreno
President, Inter-American Development Bank

In 1994, at the very first Summit of the Americas, held in Miami, the leaders of the hemisphere agreed with one voice that improving regional infrastructure can advance integration and the prosperity of our fellow citizens. They stressed that investments in transportation, energy, and telecommunications can make the movement of goods and services more efficient and bring the people of the hemisphere closer together. Every Summit of the Americas since then has returned to this theme, and infrastructure remains an enduring priority for the region.

More recently, declarations from the Summits of the Americas and other meetings at the subregional level have provided a strong mandate for continued investment in the physical integration of the hemisphere. These mandates also stress the need to complement investments in the “hardware” of physical integration with equally important investments in appropriate “software,” such as better policies, harmonized regulatory frameworks, and procedures to reduce the cost of trade and to make it more secure. To harness the true potential of regional integration, we must move down these two paths simultaneously. Success requires action at the regional as well as the national level, and the consensus for such action requires forums for dialogue and cooperation across borders. Our leaders have also recognized, through the Summits of the Americas and other meetings, that building the hardware and software of regional integration requires several types of funding—loans, private sector investment, and non-reimbursable assistance.

So then, how do we promote simultaneous investment in the hardware and software of integration? What can policymakers do to think regionally and act nationally in setting investment and regulatory frameworks? These are the sorts of issues that still need attention in building the hemisphere’s integration agenda. Addressing them will require strong South-South cooperation and triangular arrangements involving third-party donors. This will come about by increasing the exchange of knowledge and experiences, and by facilitating consensus solutions to collective challenges through the creation of regional public goods. Physical integration efforts such as the 10-country Mesoamerican Project and the Initiative for Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America—being implemented through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)—are promoting that dialogue, planning future investments, and building new, strong partnerships.

When we look specifically at transport and logistics, we essentially find that costs hamper our region’s capacity to compete globally. Many areas in Latin America and the Caribbean have poor road coverage and the transport mix still does not match our region’s needs, while we lag behind other world regions in harmonizing trade and infrastructure regulations. This contributes to higher transport costs and holds back trade within the hemisphere and with the rest of the world. Furthermore, the region’s ports face challenges in expanding capacity and improving efficiency to keep pace with global progress, since 80 percent of the world’s traded goods are transported by sea. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the quality of air transport infrastructure is adequate; however, this market would benefit from more competition in support services such as cargo handling.
From Cartagena Forward

From Comprehensive Dialogue to Concrete Action

When it comes to energy, Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest reliance on renewable sources of power of any region in the world. Yet, subsidies that are not well targeted to low-income populations increase fuel demand and generate an additional burden on the energy infrastructure. These resources could be better used, encouraging new and efficient technologies with renewable energy investments. The Central American Electric Interconnection System— which now serves a regional electricity market with a transmission system some 1,800 kilometers long— offers important lessons for the region. Energy integration requires a long-term political commitment, as well as strong economic and technical fundamentals, in order to be implemented successfully. We anticipate that the Andean Electric Interconnection system will have similar positive impacts in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Broadband is now a basic resource for economic growth and social development. Various studies show that an increase of 10 percent in broadband penetration in developing countries has an effect on the growth of gross domestic product between 1 and 1.4 percent. Lack of coverage and high prices, as well as inadequate regulatory frameworks, are the principal reasons the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are behind industrialized countries in this area. These challenges inhibit the deployment of new infrastructure and new services, to the detriment not only of users, but also of competitiveness and employment.

The Inter-American Development Bank is pleased to support the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in tackling these challenges. Through lending, technical assistance, and knowledge, the IDB will help the region make the appropriate investments in the software and hardware of integration. Our InfraFund is a fast-disbursing facility for preparing climate-resilient and sustainable infrastructure projects. It is dedicated to helping public, private, and mixed-capital entities in the region identify and develop bankable projects that can obtain financing. Once projects are ready for financing, the IDB continues to support project execution in areas such as sustainable transport, freight logistics, and road safety. Also, our Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Initiative works to achieve regional energy development and integration in the Americas, while the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative helps growing municipalities with issues involving environmental sustainability and climate change, urban development, and fiscal sustainability and governance.

Development in Latin America and the Caribbean depends on meeting our infrastructure challenges. It is imperative that we invest to improve roads, pipelines, power grids, and networks. It is also essential that we work to harmonize regulations and other instruments. And, more importantly, our work should be sustainable.

The Summit of the Americas is an important forum for pressing ahead with investments in regional integration. It promotes regional dialogue, regional cooperation, and a common vision of a more effectively connected hemisphere.

A Commitment to Infrastructure for Physical Integration

L. Enrique García
Executive President, Development Bank of Latin America

As a Latin American development bank, CAF is strongly committed to the Summits of the Americas process and, in particular, to the work it carries out under the aegis of the Joint Summit Working Group. That support is part of the institutional efforts underway to help consolidate the ongoing regional integration process and strengthen integration initiatives geared toward the region’s sustainable development.

In that context, CAF places particular importance on the implementation of the mandates handed down by the Sixth Summit of the Americas. It is convinced that, through their plans of action and follow-up mechanisms, these Summits have proved their ability to undertake joint actions on matters of common interest and shared challenges.

CAF’s permanent presence in this process bolsters the institution’s participation in priority projects for the development and integration agendas of its 18 shareholder countries. Under that commitment, CAF pursues specific measures in areas that overlap significantly with the priorities set by the Sixth Summit, such as physical infrastructure, anti-poverty efforts, disaster prevention, citizen security, and access to new technologies. I will take this opportunity to address one of the areas in which the bank participates most actively: infrastructure for physical integration.

Infrastructure as a Factor in Sustainable Development

There is broad international consensus on the importance of infrastructure for development. Infrastructure reduces transportation costs, inventory sizes, and logistical costs; this in turn helps to grow markets, and brings consumers and producers together. Domestically, it reduces production costs and prices. It also attracts direct foreign investment, thereby linking national economies to international value chains. Finally, infrastructure makes growth more inclusive by better distributing its benefits to the population, and it facilitates access to services such as health and education, which has a direct and positive impact on people’s quality of life.

Infrastructure has been shown to have a positive impact on economic growth, and that impact tends to be greater in countries with lower levels of income. Evidence suggests that a modern economy requires a minimum level of infrastructure, and that this level increases along with per capita income. Without this minimum level, limiting factors arise that compromise a country’s opportunities for growth.

In Latin America, the lack of adequate infrastructure has reached such a level that it has been identified as one of the main factors limiting economic growth and one of the central causes behind the low level of intraregional trade. CAF recently published a report that offers a detailed analysis of infrastructure problems in...
The study states that the shortcomings experienced at the regional level can be partially explained by the difficulties encountered by governments in funding infrastructure investments, the inability of the private sector to cover those investment needs, the absence of a proper regulatory framework, the lack of effective territorial planning, and other issues. These factors lead to an inadequate provision of services and to bottlenecks that curtail competitiveness and economic growth.

As a result, Latin America’s infrastructure gap has widened compared to the nations of Asia and, to an even greater extent, to the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Our region, which currently invests around 3 percent of GDP in infrastructure, must attain a level of 6 percent in this area if it hopes to close that gap.

With the intensification of globalization, the development of infrastructure is no longer an exclusively domestic matter. An ever-increasing number of projects cross national borders, and attending to infrastructure needs is beyond the reach of individual countries. In addition, quality infrastructure is a prerequisite for regional integration processes based on the free movement of goods, services, and people. For all those reasons, regional cooperation is vital both for developing infrastructure and for mobilizing sources of funding.

**CAF’s Contribution to Integration Projects**

CAF has been a clear leader in promoting and funding physical integration projects in Latin America. Indeed, over the past decade it has become the region’s leading source of multilateral financing for infrastructure and energy projects.

In South America, since the year 2000, those projects have been channeled through the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), in which CAF plays a central role. IIRSA represents a milestone in progress when it comes to physical integration, by encouraging project coordination and funding—chiefly for transportation and electricity—and developing innovative approaches for planning and coordination. One important example of this is the grouping of projects around integration and development hubs. The aim is to tap into synergies between different types of infrastructure, interconnecting the flow of goods, people, and information and seeking to tie them in with other dimensions of territorial development. IIRSA has encouraged use of a methodology called indicative territorial planning, as well as strategic environmental evaluations and the training of government officials. In 2010, the initiative was adopted and continued by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its Infrastructure and Planning Council (COSIPLAN).

In the Central American region, CAF has also supported the Mesoamerican Project, which continues the efforts of the Puebla-Panama Plan and has been the main channel for developing physical integration projects in Central America, mainly highway networks and the integration of electrical systems. Specifically, CAF has provided technical consulting and funding for the investment program along Costa Rica’s “Atlantic Corridor” and for improvements in its road connections with Panama.

To date, CAF has funded more than 60 regional integration projects for an amount of some US$8 billion, which has triggered total investment in excess of $25 billion.

1 La Infraestructura en el Desarrollo Integral de América Latina: Diagnóstico estratégico y propuestas para una agenda prioritaria (at http://caf.com/attach/19/publicaciones/infraestructura/libros.html).

It must also be noted that CAF’s support for regional integration processes involves more than funding regional infrastructure projects. Its Program for Border Development and Integration Support; its geo-referenced information services in support of planning, provided by GeoSUR; and its First-Class Ports Program all share CAF’s vision of regional integration.

**An Ambitious Portfolio for Regional Integration**

More recently, as part of COSIPLAN, the nations of South America identified a portfolio of 31 structured projects—the Priority Agenda for Integration Projects (API). The execution of this agenda will encourage connectivity in the region through the construction and efficient operation of infrastructure, adhering to criteria for sustainable economic and social development while protecting the environment and the balance of ecosystems.

Recognizing that the task of planning the construction of regional infrastructure requires ongoing updates and adjustments, the aim is to go above and beyond by combining the construction of infrastructure with elements to allow its optimal use. These include laws and regulations, steps to improve logistics and boost production, and the environmental and social considerations necessary to ensure sustainability. Based on the API projects and the COSIPLAN project portfolio, work is beginning on the design of Territorial Integration Programs, with a broader, more comprehensive view of regional development.

In the telecommunications sector, CAF promotes the expansion of broadband services, which will require major investments over the coming years as well as studies to ensure an efficient exchange of regional data traffic and use of the Internet in Latin America.

Based on its extensive experience supporting the funding of infrastructure and integration processes in Latin America, CAF has a flexible organization that adapts to the region’s needs. It has assembled teams of specialists from each infrastructure sector and technicians to provide consulting and financial structuring for public-private partnership operations, investment banking, and novel financing mechanisms. It has also established cooperation agreements with the leading development banks and financial agencies from other regions, to channel funds from other sources into investments in Latin America.

All of this—together with its wealth of databases on information, follow-up, monitoring, comparisons, and countries’ stances on important issues related to infrastructure; its support programs for institutional strengthening; and its systems for assessing the impact of infrastructure investments on competitiveness and development—make CAF a key ally in addressing the region’s challenges in this area.

With full respect for the approaches adopted by each country regarding state and market participation in the economy, CAF advocates a model that offers higher rates of sustained, quality growth that promotes social inclusion and reduces inequality, that respects cultural diversity, and that protects the environment.

Of course, attaining that vision requires investment in regional integration infrastructure. But it also demands a transformation to incorporate technology and innovation into the productive process; the design of a strategy for intelligent international insertion; the strengthening and transparency of institutions; and investments in all forms of capital: physical, social, productive, and financial.

In that context, the region and the institutions that make up the Joint Summit Working Group can count on CAF’s wholehearted support in contributing to the implementation of the Cartagena mandates, in order to build a region that is more integrated, sustainable, and inclusive.
Latin America and the Caribbean countries aren’t what they used to be. And from our vantage point, that’s a positive development.

During the past decade, the region has experienced remarkable economic performance together with social progress. More inclusive labor markets, expanded safety nets, improved educational outcomes, macroeconomic stability, and relatively high rates of growth are all part of the structural forces that have promoted these positive gains.

Since 2003, the year poverty began its steady decline, some 73 million Latin Americans have emerged from its ranks. Today, for the first time in the region’s history, the number of people who are part of the middle class is about to surpass the number who are poor.

Labor market income for both men and women was the greatest force behind the region’s decline in inequality since the early 2000s, with transfers contributing just over a third of the decline (36 percent).

And while the extent of social and economic progress over the past decade was not the same across countries within the region (with the small commodity-importing countries of Central America and the Caribbean in particular performing well below the region’s average), the advancement has been palpable for most of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean.

This dramatic transformation contrasts sharply with the lagging performance of prior decades. The 1980s were Latin America’s “lost decade.” The region was beset by hyperinflation, oppressive national debt, stagnant economies, and an explosion in poverty. In the 1990s, the middle class made up around 21 percent of the population for most of the decade, barely keeping pace with population growth.

The good news, and perhaps an encouraging sign for some struggling economies around the world today, is that the region was able to turn things around in a relatively short time. It was not an easy process and required significant adjustments, efforts, and investments in order to achieve such promising results.

A Turning Point

By the 1990s, Latin American governments were determined to close the debt chapter and grow their way out of the crisis. To achieve this, governments adopted market-oriented reforms to increase trade and promote private investment.
Growth increased. Debt eased, and governments got a handle on inflation, bringing it down to single digits after years of rates in the hundreds or worse.

The percentage of people living at or below the poverty line, however, remained largely unchanged. Pro-growth reforms were not necessarily favoring the most vulnerable. The trickle-down effect proved to be insufficient.

With economic stability in place, leaders in the region began to reassess the role of public policy. A government could be interested in economic growth while simultaneously striving to directly affect inequality through smart regulation as well as public spending in the social and human development sectors.

Solid fiscal and public management was no longer viewed as clashing with social commitments, but rather as two sides of the same coin. Latin America and the Caribbean—the most unequal region in the world—began to see an impressive reduction in the number of people in poverty, together with a reduction in inequality. This was good for the people and good for business.

How exactly have these anti-poverty and equality gains occurred? According to World Bank research, the decline can be attributed to a combination of labor and non-labor income, in particular better-targeted transfer programs such as conditional cash transfers, which received upwards of US$3 billion of World Bank support during the 2008-2009 crises.

Of these two major factors, labor income has been far more significant. The labor market contribution to equalization is most salient in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, where it represented at least 60 percent of the overall decline in poverty. In general, most of the reduction in inequality can be attributed to an increase in workers’ hourly earnings.

With labor markets playing such an important role, some people may be inclined to conclude that it is best to leave it all to the market. The fact is, however, that without adequate social public policy and investments—such as policies aimed at improving education, nutrition, and health—these changes would not have taken place.

Growth for All

One crucial aspect in Latin America’s recent transformation has had to do with governments’ concerted efforts to streamline and modernize public spending. Twenty years ago, many countries in the region were dealing with fiscal imbalances; thus their focus was on how to restrict expenditures to reduce deficits. Nowadays, better macro and fiscal positions have allowed many administrations to shift the focus to the quality of their expenditures.

To that end, the World Bank has supported a broad array of reforms. These range from basic improvements that allow governments to track, account for, and manage budgets as part of a coherent system to more sophisticated public management tools that have enabled many governments in the region to move to more advanced stages and design results-based budgeting.

Efforts to increase efficiency and transparency in public spending have the added benefit of increasing public trust in government and strengthening the involvement of citizens and businesses in public life, including their willingness to pay taxes. That can only be welcomed in a region where, with the exception of Brazil, the average country collects only about 17 percent of GDP in public revenue—half the average of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The World Bank’s work on this front has also led us to realize that one of the most significant challenges remains at the local level. Stronger management capacity and accountability at the subnational level is critical, since a large and growing percentage of public funds are executed there. Many local governments are also the most directly impacted by the region’s rapid urbanization as well as environmental and economic shocks.

Take water, for instance. Latin American countries currently collect and treat less than half of the wastewater they generate. Fortunately, most of the mega-cities in the region—including Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Lima—are taking action, expanding water collection systems and building new treatment plants. Clearly, governments in the region need to play a decisive role in improving quality of life today and for future generations.

Cities currently account for over two-thirds of the world’s energy consumption and 70 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Recently, the City of Rio de Janeiro and the World Bank launched a groundbreaking, city-level program to address the two mega-trends of the 21st century: urbanization and climate change. The Rio de Janeiro Low Carbon City Development Program will help Rio monitor and account for low carbon investments and climate-change mitigation actions across different sectors in the city. The program is a business model that can be applied to other cities around the world.

Latin America has come a long way. Still, in many cities today, crime and violence have become a deterrent to development. The bottom quintile of the region’s urban population still lacks access to sanitation, and 75 percent of that bottom quintile does not have running water.

Sustaining and expanding growth through increased productivity and economic diversification should be seen as a necessity and a condition not only to preserve and increase economic gains but also to protect and consolidate social achievements, expand the social agenda, and accelerate the path to shared prosperity.

The task ahead is so big that even during uncertain and volatile environments, governments could take advantage of the current opportunity and not only protect and preserve their social policies and programs but also innovate and develop regulations to leverage and bring private sector investments into the social sectors. Countries such as Chile, Mexico, and Brazil have already taken steps in this direction.

Confronting these challenges requires even more effective planning and management, together with close coordination among governments, businesses, and society at large. The region has a chance to continue on its path of transforming for the better. The people want and need smarter governments supporting more innovation, better education, and increased productivity. This, together with a dynamic private sector, will ensure equality of opportunities for everyone.
Growth and Prosperity in the Rural Territories of the Americas

Víctor M. Villalobos
Director General, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture

Since the Third Summit of the Americas (Quebec City, 2001), the issue of agriculture and rural well-being has been included in the commitments made by the hemisphere's Heads of State and Government, in recognition of its importance to the harmonious and inclusive development of our countries. An essential part of this institutional process has been the positions, recommendations, and commitments put forward at the biennial ministerial meetings on agriculture, the most recent of which was held in 2011 in San José, Costa Rica.

The Sixth Summit of the Americas continued in that direction and, in addressing the problem of poverty and inequity, underscored the region’s pending social debt when it comes to rural areas. That has meant a very clear mandate for the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), which was already working on that specific issue.

Rural Poverty, Inequality, and Inequity in the Americas

Poverty, social and territorial inequality, and inequity have afflicted most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries for a long time. Those factors not only have a direct negative effect on the population; they also curtail countries’ potential for growth. Macroeconomic and sector-specific policies, even those that have encouraged economic growth, have been insufficient to reduce poverty and social and territorial inequalities, and this has led to inequity. That means that besides the macroeconomic and sector-specific policies necessary to attain moderate growth, countries need additional mechanisms capable of synchronizing the dynamics of the least-advantaged areas.

The concept of poverty refers, strictly speaking, to economic conditions where basic needs cannot be met. It is, however, a phenomenon that goes far beyond the economic arena, in that it also affects the political, institutional, social, and environmental dimensions. Poverty makes it more difficult, sometimes impossible, to gain access to resources and to such basic necessities as capital, health, and education, which in turn deepens inequality and social exclusion. When other factors of exclusion—such as geographical location, gender, age, and ethnic origin—are added to the equation, the conditions that make certain social groups vulnerable increase significantly in rural areas. Solving those problems is a priority for both governments and international organizations such as IICA, which has offered its technical capacities to address the situation.

In the Americas, indicators of economic growth coexist alongside indicators showing persistently high rates of rural poverty; what is more, in many countries, poverty in rural territories is more pronounced than in urban areas.

The table below shows that in Latin America as a whole, with few exceptions, poverty is essentially a rural phenomenon, reaching levels of up to 70 percent of the population. The common denominator in this phenomenon is that although all Latin American countries report positive GDP growth, the benefits are distributed unequally among the different sectors of society and different geographical areas, to the detriment of rural inhabitants and territories. This underscores the size of the challenge facing both governments and societies.

Behind these asymmetries there lies a reality that rural territories must confront, involving difficulties in agriculture and other economic activities, inadequate infrastructure, perceived differences with the more developed urban world, low standards of living, environmental decay, exclusion, and the lack of governance and governability.

The Role of IICA

In IICA’s view, the way to rural prosperity in the Americas is through a series of interconnected links among macroeconomic policies, sector-specific policies, and public policies for the development of rural territories, economic growth, and higher living standards.

Given its nature, IICA has traditionally worked in the agricultural policy arena. This focus is reflected in the objectives laid out in its 2010-2014 Medium-Term Plan: Promoting Competitive and Sustainable Agriculture in the Americas:

“improve the productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector; strengthen agriculture’s contribution to the development of territories and to rural well-being; improve agriculture’s capacity to mitigate the effects of, and adapt to, climate change, and make better use of natural resources; and improve agriculture’s contribution to food security.”

IICA understands, then, the need to tackle inequality as a key challenge on the public agenda of its member countries and for rural societies, and also the need to take action on public policies for the development of rural territories. This is critical not only to encourage more equitable growth in social and territorial terms, but also to undertake more efficient actions in other critical aspects such as poverty reduction, food security, climate change, support for family agriculture and small-scale farming, and policies geared toward women, young people, indigenous populations, and vulnerable sectors of the population in general. IICA also acts within its authority to modernize public policies and institutional frameworks for the development of agriculture and of rural areas.

IICA is supporting its member countries with several initiatives related to the development of rural territories, using such instruments as the Central American Strategy for Rural Area-based Development (ECADERT) and the Project on Innovative Policies for the Development of Rural Territories in Latin America (PIDERAL).

ECADERT: A Strategy for Sustainable Development

The 2010-2030 Central American Strategy for Rural Area-based Development (ECADERT) was approved by the Heads of State and Government of the eight member countries of the Central American Integration System (SICA) in June 2010. It aims to bring about a new generation of public policies for sustainable rural development,
Medium- and Long-Term Implications of IICA Activities

With the launch of these strategies and public policies for the development of rural territories, the 10 countries participating in ECADERT and PIDERAL will be able to incorporate those territories and their inhabitants into the general dynamics of national development, thereby contributing to prosperity with equity. The lessons learned from the overall experience will make it possible to expand these types of strategies and policies to the other countries in the hemisphere.

Percentage of Rural and Urban Poverty, and GDP Growth

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<td></td>
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<td>National</td>
<td>Urban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>27.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>More than 40%</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>44.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>54.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>67.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>61.9</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>41.4</td>
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<td>Latin America</td>
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The first decade of this century has unquestionably brought positive changes for Latin America in terms of sustained growth and reduced rates of poverty and inequality. Despite these improvements (Figures 1 and 2), Latin America remains the most unequal region in the world. The International Labour Organization (ILO) maintains that the improved distribution of income and reduced poverty rates have been achieved mainly through positive, sustained rates of growth, along with the adoption of social policies that have raised the incomes of people in the lowest deciles. Labor policies have not played the role expected of them in reducing poverty and improving income distribution, due to the absence of a priority focus on the functioning of the labor market and the central importance of employment.

Employment typically provides the main path for most individuals and households to obtain an income or wages that will lift them out of poverty. However, it must be recognized that there are still many obstacles to obtaining work, especially decent work. That means a job that pays enough to ensure well-being, that empowers individuals to organize themselves and to participate in a social dialogue about the terms and conditions of their employment, and that provides them with social protection and respects their basic rights.

The growth experienced in the first decade of the century encouraged many people to enter the labor market and was reflected in higher rates of participation. Meanwhile, the percentage of employed people living in poverty also fell between 2002 and 2008. Besides these overall changes, we note that inequality dropped more in countries where formal employment rose and where minimum wages increased more significantly. This underscores the importance of labor institutions and policies in promoting more inclusive and stable growth.

To promote sustained and inclusive growth, the ILO is pursuing a series of policies that once again place employment at the heart of the debate. We remain committed to promoting decent work in the region, which implies further extending the reforms implemented under the Global Jobs Pact. These include expanding the minimum wage and defending its real value; redoubling efforts to eliminate forced labor and child labor; guaranteeing social security through contributory and non-contributory pension plans; and encouraging social dialogue and the representation of workers and employers.
However, and in spite of the improvements in income distribution, one key problem the region has faced since before the recent international financial crisis is a poor functional distribution of income. In general, the region’s improved income distribution is due to social policies and not to the improved performance of the labor market. Between 2002 and 2008, the most recent period of economic expansion, the share of wages and salaries in GDP fell in 13 of the 21 countries in the region for which figures are available, while it rose in only 8 of them. This would seem to indicate that wages grew less than productivity and, consequently, that the redistribution was unfavorable for workers. That is a cause for concern in a region with an income distribution that is so unequal. Above and beyond the ethical dimension, this jeopardizes the social and economic sustainability of that growth. It is therefore vitally important that we continue to support tripartite social dialogue that focuses on job quality and decent earnings.

Consequently, wage policies and collective bargaining are of utmost importance in the region. According to the ILO’s 2011 Labour Overview: “A policy to adjust the minimum wage can become a pillar of socioeconomic development by functioning as a tool to redistribute income (through its effect on the wage floor) and to fight poverty (by raising the wages of the most vulnerable workers), with broad impact on aggregate demand and its composition.” Similarly, the role of collective bargaining is essential in improving the functional distribution of income. The greater the bargaining coordination and coverage, the less income inequality within a society. Likewise, studies carried out by the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have concluded that more widespread collective bargaining is associated with lower wage inequality and narrower gaps between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers and between the earnings of men and women.

Another red flag in the region is that women and young people are particularly vulnerable to difficulties in entering the labor market. Both groups have low levels of labor market participation and higher unemployment rates, and they are disproportionately likely to be involved in low-productivity and low-wage activities. Disparities in labor market participation by sex are pronounced across the region—even more so for women in the lower deciles of the income distribution. Women represent a majority of unpaid workers and are more often found in informal activities. And an earnings gap between men and women is still found throughout the region.

Major gender disparities in work performed inside the home can prevent women from participating in the labor market. If entering the labor market requires finding alternatives for such tasks as taking care of children or other dependents, and if that responsibility continues to fall disproportionately on families and on women, wage levels for women must therefore take into account the cost of replacing this type of care work. If the remuneration women are offered does not represent a fair exchange for the care they normally provide, it is unlikely that they will join the labor market. It is therefore not surprising that labor-market participation rates by women with young children tend to be very low in the region.

Another commitment to promote decent work and fundamental rights involves efforts to end child labor. Latin America and the Caribbean is one region in the world where child labor is on the decline. Even still, there are 14 million children and adolescents (5 to 17 years old) who are working—10 percent of the total in that age range—and 9.4 million of them do work that is dangerous and threatens their physical or psychological integrity.

With the aim of encouraging women’s equal participation in the job market, and of reducing and redistributing the costs associated with care work, the ILO is supporting a series of initiatives in the region to comply with labor standards, implement labor policies, and defend the principle of equal pay for equal work. These policies include supporting the adoption of Convention 189 on domestic workers; monitoring compliance with Conventions 100 and 101 on the right to equal pay and against discrimination; promoting comprehensive “social protection floors” that expand care services; and emphasizing the importance of conciliatory policies that help to balance the demands of work and family life. These policies will facilitate more equitable participation by women in the labor market and will protect their rights and those of their families. The hope in the medium term is to close the labor participation gap between men and women by around 10 percentage points (that is, by almost 50 percent) and reduce the gender earnings gap by more than 3 percentage points (i.e., 10 percent). This would help lift some two million people out of poverty.

Similarly, the ILO is supporting initiatives to improve youth labor insertion through technical cooperation and social-dialogue activities that will improve their education and training, strengthen labor market intermediation services, and publicize information about their labor rights. We hope that with these actions a much smaller percentage of the jobs held by young people will be in informal employment.

Finally, we hope that with the agreements on decent work, signed in eight countries in the region, and the “Social Protection Floor Initiative,” we will be able to take steps to improve workers’ pay, extend social security, expand and strengthen access to social protection, strengthen the commitment to basic rights, and further social dialogue. With these agreements we hope to promote formal employment, raise the earnings of the most vulnerable workers, and increase the number of workers who contribute to social security.

It is not enough just to see the numbers to determine what is happening in a society; we must also open our ears and listen to the people and hear their underlying concern. Whether we like it or not, it is there. Men and women alike expect more from the effort they put into their work. They expect fairer treatment and fairer earnings. It is not enough just to see the numbers to determine what is happening in a society; we must also open our ears and listen to the people and hear their underlying concern. Whether we like it or not, it is there. Men and women alike expect more from the effort they put into their work. They expect fairer treatment and fairer earnings.

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7 2011 Labour Overview, ILO.
11 Consistent with the commitments set out in the various conventions on the protection of motherhood: Nos. 3 (1919), 103 (1952), and 183 (2000).
13 These calculations are based on the parameters of a study by Joana Costa, Elydia Silva and Fábio Vaz ("The Role of Gender Inequalities in Explaining Income Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidences from Latin American Countries," International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Working Paper No. 52, April 2009) and on ILO and CEPALSTAT figures for differentials in wages and participation by sex.
One of the most important characteristics of the world today is the awareness that global themes exist, themes whose solution can be achieved only through the efforts, participation, and cooperation of all human beings. Poverty, drug abuse, insecurity, violence, and disasters—the latter of which are exacerbated by the dynamics of climate change—are acknowledged to be priority challenges, which call for a coordinated commitment by the international community to address their causes and consequences.

In the Western Hemisphere, the increasing importance attached to disaster risk management is fully justified by the severe impact disasters have on the lives of millions of people, and their negative consequences for the sustainable development of nations. Recent reports by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, the World Bank, the Organization of American States, and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean warn about the global trend toward a spiraling increase in disasters. In the last five years, the Americas alone have been hit by such serious disasters as the floods in Colombia resulting from the La Niña phenomenon (2010-2011), the earthquakes in Haiti (2010) and Chile (2010), and tropical storms, including Ida (2009) and Agatha (2010) in Central America, and Noel and Olga (2007) in the Caribbean.

In the absence of adequate procedures for overall recovery, disasters have decisive consequences for household impoverishment and the generation of multiple insecurities. For states, disasters result in a staggeringly high loss of resources needed for development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Assuredly, in the case of a large number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, disasters have set them back for years.

The causes of disasters have a close relationship to the value a particular society attaches to sustainable development principles and to how it implements them. Disaster risks are frequently the result of a cumulative development debt or the product of precariously planned and executed processes (inadequate urban development or public investment planning).

Although efforts have been made during the last two decades to formulate national policies and institutional arrangements for disaster risk management, there are enormous gaps and weaknesses in the capacity to respond to concrete risk conditions. As a matter of priority, states must vigorously assume risk management as a development issue, ensure the sustainability of institutional risk-reduction efforts, better distribute public

1 Technical document for the Sixth Summit of the Americas. Reducing Risks and Responding to Disasters, 2012. Disasters increased fivefold between 1975 and 2005. A total of 98 major climatic and geophysical disasters have occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean, with damages higher than US$49 billion.
3 World Bank, ISDR, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (www.gfdrr.org).
From Cartagena Forward

The mandate of the Sixth Summit of the Americas sends a clear message, one that strengthens the agenda for disaster mitigation in the hemisphere. It emphasizes that risk management has to be a priority in development strategies and in the allocation of national resources, calls for stronger horizontal cooperation strategies that facilitate joint research, encourages the exchange of knowledge on best practices, and promotes the use of efficient regional and subregional instruments for risk reduction and crisis response.

This mandate on disasters was crafted with broad hemispheric involvement. It was the outcome of preparatory work enriched by national and regional consultations with public institutions, civil society organizations, and international organizations, and detailed discussion sessions within the Summit Implementation Review Group.

As far as implementation of the Sixth Summit’s disaster-related mandate is concerned, the region has enormous capacities in the countries, the regional and subregional institutional system, and international organizations involved in the process. Hundreds of national planning and crisis-response entities, media outlets, and communities in the region are prepared to share knowledge on disaster risk management and climate adaptation. It is now essential to strengthen the regional coordination that can direct and channel this growing interest in disaster risk management in the hemisphere.

The Role of UNDP

For more than two decades now, UNDP has been supporting modernization of public policies and the incorporation of disaster risk management into national and local agendas. To this end, it promotes a global knowledge network, enabling local, national, and international players, wherever they may be, to have access to information and expertise.

UNDP currently supports national processes to incorporate disaster risk reduction into development strategies in the national and local spheres in most countries of the region, especially in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Thus, for example, in Bogotá it is supporting city officials in modifying the strategies and regulations of the District System for Disaster Risk Management. In the Caribbean region of Colombia, it is facilitating access to knowledge in order to enable officials to design subnational plans for threat and risk reduction. Moreover, in Honduras, it is supporting the development of regulations for national risk-reduction laws, and in Cuba and Ecuador it is making disaster mitigation a crosscutting aspect of sectoral priorities.

In addition, UNDP has an extended record of creating networks for exchange and horizontal cooperation, such as the network of Andean and of Central American cities on disaster risk management. In light of the mandate of the Sixth Summit, UNDP has supported the incorporation of disaster risk management into the agenda of the Dominican Republic–Colombia Binational Commission, the development of guided missions on knowledge exchange, and the design of a regional project of civil society organizations and local authorities in Latin America.

Considering the relationship between disasters and platforms for poverty reduction, gender, and climate change, UNDP is supporting initiatives to facilitate the development of synergies. These include the Joint Proposal for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Adaptation in Central America; Disaster Risk Reduction and

responsibilities among ministries and sectoral institutions, promote citizen awareness and involvement, strengthen capacities in their territories, and improve the provision of scientific and technical information services for decision making.

UNDP, primarily with support from its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, has a strong global mandate to support post-disaster recovery processes. At present, it is supporting recovery processes in a group of seven countries in the region, such as those in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake and those in the Dominican Republic in response to the cumulative effects of disasters in the Lake Enriquillo area in the border zone with Haiti, one of the poorest regions of the country.

Medium- and Long-Term Challenges

Climate change and the visible impact it is already having on the occurrence of critical events and disasters are one of the primary challenges facing the hemisphere. The region, because of its sensitivity and exposure to climate change, is duty-bound to spearhead global agreements in order to guarantee mitigation and facilitate climate adaptation.

Furthermore, the hemisphere is confronting the enormous challenge of formulating truly effective national public policies that incorporate risk management into the development vision. Now, after slightly less than two decades of promotion and development of risk-management policies, consideration should be given to assessing their effectiveness and their real capacity to promote change. The impact of these policies must be evaluated inclusively, with a focus on sustainable development and on the basis of consultation with those segments of society that are most at risk and regularly excluded, for example, women and the poorest rural inhabitants.

The mandate of the Sixth Summit in the area of disasters opens a window of opportunity that is not to be missed. Horizontal cooperation in disaster risk management—expressed, for example, in the exchange of experiences among peer entities by topic, using virtual and live means—has a great potential to transform political and institutional development in risk management, and constitutes the primary challenge for countries and international organizations working on the mandate.

In conclusion, UNDP reaffirms its commitment to respond to the mandate of the Sixth Summit of the Americas and to support countries in fulfilling it. It will especially focus on the task of expanding opportunities for horizontal cooperation and mutual support and strengthening the knowledge network and the mobilization of resources for disaster management in the region, in a framework of cooperation with the organizations of the inter-American system and those of the United Nations present in the region.
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), as Central America’s foremost development financing institution, has set the vision of being a strategic partner in improving the quality of life of this subregion’s population, through sustainable development of the land and its resources.

Mindful of the problems affecting the region due to the effects of climate change and vulnerability to natural disasters, CABEI has adopted a series of measures and actions to appropriately manage disaster mitigation, prevention, and adaptation. These measures help to provide an efficient and timely response to the needs of the Central American region.

In the regional context, natural disaster risk reduction and management, along with climate change mitigation and adaptation, is a topic of particular importance to the Central American countries. According to the 2010 State of the Region Report, in the previous decade, protected areas throughout the Central American territory increased by 368,558 hectares, and nine natural areas were declared as world heritage sites. Likewise, the number of wetlands declared to be of international importance under the Ramsar Convention rose from 37 to 46 in the previous five years. Nonetheless, the region also lost 248,400 hectares of wetlands over the previous 25 years, and the number of endangered species increased by 82 percent from 2002 to 2010, with fish and amphibians the most affected species.

In global terms, Central America has a negative ecological footprint, with each inhabitant requiring 10 percent more territory than is available to satisfy his or her consumption. According to the State of the Region report, this footprint is even greater in countries within the region with a higher human development index. Consequently, we must implement long-term sustainable development models, such as increasing the rational use of our natural resources (for example, coverage of potable water services) and providing for vulnerable groups in a way that can reduce the risk of natural disasters and consolidate this development model.

The implementation of a long-term sustainable development model poses a challenge to the Central American countries, especially when we consider that the effects of climate change are having a direct impact on the region. In fact, Central America is one of the regions of the world at greatest risk, even though it is responsible for only 0.5 percent of greenhouse gases.

The effects of climate change have represented an increase of 100 percent in the number of hydrometeorological disasters over the previous decade, according to the data registered by the International Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT). Moreover, between 2005 and 2010, 1.2 million hectares of forests were lost. The effects of climate change not only impact biodiversity and natural resources, but can also be responsible for a reduction of 2 to 4 percent of a country’s GDP, depending on the severity of the disaster.

Considering the effects of climate change in Central America, disaster prevention and mitigation and climate change mitigation and adaptation are priority issues and have therefore been included on the national, regional, and international agendas in which the countries of the region participate.

Given this situation, CABEI is currently implementing the 2010–2014 Institutional Strategy, “Competitiveness with Social Integration and Development,” which focuses on the strategic areas of competitiveness, regional integration, and social development, and includes a crosscutting axis of environmental sustainability.
Complementing its focus on environmental protection in its institutional strategy, CABEI also has an environmental and social policy with three key mandates: (i) the adoption of environmental and social best practices in the Bank’s immediate surroundings through corporate social responsibility practices; (ii) the identification, mitigation, and assessment of environmental and social risks in all loan transactions approved by the Bank; and (iii) support for the region’s green agenda.

In order to implement the third mandate in its environmental and social policy, CABEI developed its environmental strategy. This strategy is designed to support measures that enhance environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources, thus contributing to the Bank’s mission to obtain a balanced economic and social development in the Central American region.

The guidelines included in CABEI’s environmental strategy are: the strengthening of institutional capacity; prevention and mitigation of pollution caused by economic activities; and conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity. Each guideline proposes specific actions to be carried out, along with their respective indicators. The six action areas, which cut across the guidelines, are: biodiversity, water, land management, waste management, energy, and air.

In light of the foregoing, CABEI has espoused environmental and social issues, taking the following into account:

- That sustainable development is part of CABEI’s vision.
- That the financial world is increasingly concerned about upholding environmental standards in its financing.
- That the environmental and social impacts of projects financed by CABEI can increase its risk level.
- That proper handling of environmental and social risks could result in opportunities, especially for the populations most at risk.
- That the general trend worldwide is for international funding sources to increasingly condition their financing on compliance with environmental and social standards.

In the context of CABEI’s environmental policy and strategy, the largest share of financing for environmental sustainability has been for the development of energy projects, focused primarily on investments that use renewable sources of energy: hydraulic, wind, and geothermal. During the two years (2010 and 2011) of implementation of the 2010–2014 Institutional Strategy, CABEI has approved more than US$728 million for 14 renewable-energy generation projects throughout Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.

In addition to the traditional support CABEI provides to finance investment projects, the Bank has established strategic partnerships with the United Nations Development Programme and the Global Environment Facility, for the management and implementation of two environmental programs. The first of these programs is the “Central American Markets for Biodiversity Project” (CAMBio), whose objective is to conserve Central American biodiversity through micro, small, and medium enterprises. The second program, “Accelerating Renewable Energy Investment in Central America and Panama” (ARECA), focuses on supporting the implementation of small renewable energy projects by mitigating existing financial barriers for investments in these projects, through the provision of technical assistance and a program of partial loan guarantees that are provided by CABEI.

As a complement to actions supported by the Bank and to provide additional financial resources for natural disaster prevention, CABEI is also promoting, in coordination with the Central American Integration System and the World Bank, the creation of the Central American Integrated Risk-Management Fund. With additional resources allocated to the risk management fund, larger investments can be made in natural disaster prevention, and funds can be readily available to meet needs that arise as a result of these disasters.

The aforementioned measures will enable CABEI to incorporate the Central American countries into the international market with balanced economic and social development conditions that are consistent with the sustainable use of resources and that include disaster prevention and mitigation in their development policies and plans.
From Cartagena Forward

From Comprehensive Dialogue to Concrete Action

It has become apparent in recent years that for countries to achieve sustained, long-term, and inclusive growth, innovation and productive development must play a priority role in their development strategies. Moving toward a scenario that is sustainable and more equal entails efforts to make the production matrix denser and more diverse in terms of high-output activities. This requires comprehensive policies on productive development, technology, and innovation, as well as a macroeconomy that is compatible with that process.

Among other things, this means reprioritizing policies on industrial development and innovation, with an emphasis on incorporating information and communication technologies (ICTs). These technologies have the potential to generate productivity gains and competitive advantages, and to increase coverage of such valuable assets as education, health, and government services.

The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have made considerable efforts to increase access to ICTs—particularly through mobile telephony, which in many of the countries has a penetration level above 100 percent, according to data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Nevertheless, the digital divide still exists, especially for more advanced technologies such as broadband Internet. Although the difference in access compared to the most developed countries is worth noting, what is most worrisome is the gap within countries, which is determined by socioeconomic conditions, such as income and education levels, and by aspects of geographical location.

For example, in the case of broadband, Graph 1 shows that differences in penetration have increased, primarily for mobile broadband. This may be a source of concern for the region, since this means of access would be the most feasible way to make the service broadly available.

Graph 2 shows that there are significant differences in the relative price of broadband calculated in terms of income. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the impact of prices on income is about 25 times higher than in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This is a significant differential factor when it comes to signing up for the service.
Graph 1. Penetration of Fixed\(^1\) and Mobile\(^2\) Broadband

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average-Caribbean</th>
<th>Average-Latin America</th>
<th>Average-OECD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ORBA/ECLAC, based on ITU data.

1. The average for the Caribbean countries corresponds to The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the countries of the Eastern Caribbean Monetary Union (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). The average for Latin America looks at 18 countries, not including Honduras, and the OECD average takes 31 countries into account.

2. The average for the Caribbean countries corresponds to The Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The average for Latin America looks at 15 countries, not including Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama. The OECD average takes 31 countries into account.

Graph 2. Affordability: Relative Cost of Access to Fixed Broadband Internet\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Average-Latin America</th>
<th>Average-OECD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ORBA/ECLAC, based on data from operators and from the Regional Dialogue on the Information Society (DIRSI).

In assessing broadband Internet service, its quality must be considered. One of the parameters used is to measure both upload and download connection speeds. According to data from CEPAL's Regional Broadband Observatory (ORBA), the region also lags behind in this regard since these speeds are considerably slower than in Europe. This is a key variable since it affects the use of applications.

Gaps in broadband access exist not only between countries but also within them. One of the major determinants of broadband use is the income level of a population: the higher the income, the greater the service's penetration.

The high cost of broadband can also be explained by the lack of adequate infrastructure for making it widely available. The countries of the region are therefore assessing the possibility of establishing a regional fiber-optic ring that would help cut costs and generate a more robust regional Internet market. Likewise, some countries, such as Brazil, have planned to invest in new submarine cables to access other markets, such as Europe.

3. The service fees shown are for April 2011 for the Latin American countries, the United States, and Canada, and for May 2011 for the Caribbean countries.
The incorporation of ICTs in countries is measured not only in terms of access but also in terms of their acceptance and use. For example, about half of the countries of the region have a published ICT policy for formal education, and plans such as CEIBAL in Uruguay, Enlaces de Chile (Links of Chile), and Conectar Igualdad (Connecting Equality) in Argentina, among others, have made it possible to disseminate the new technologies to students and professors. Today the challenge is to incorporate ICTs into initial teacher training and to close the “second digital gap,” which has to do with differences in the use of ICTs and the ability to take advantage of them.

In addition, according to various international indices, e-government has been developed or is under development in most countries of the region. For example, the United Nations E-Government Survey 2012 indicates that the Americas (including the United States and Canada) is the second most developed region as far as e-government is concerned. The report notes that in 2012 the South American and Caribbean subregions added points to their ranking in the index compared with the previous report, and that three countries in the region (Barbados, Chile, and Colombia) stand out as emerging leaders in the development of e-government.

In the health arena, there is a trend toward incorporating ICTs into such areas as management, telemedicine, and distance education. However, due to significant shortfalls in terms of indicators and methodologies used to evaluate the success or failure of the various e-health applications, it is difficult for governments to commit to large-scale projects and to the adoption of long-term strategies and policies. In spite of this, as part of the project ECLAC @US2, a network of 31 health experts from 12 countries has been established to facilitate the exchange of information and experiences and to promote debate on the role of e-health in reducing social inequalities.

The region has made clear strides in the information society, taking into account mobile phone coverage levels, expanded access to broadband Internet, infrastructure investment projects in broadband technology, investments in ICTs, ICT education programs, and advances in e-government and e-health, as well as the gradual spread of digital policies. However, these recognized gains stand in contrast to weaker ones in the digital economy, where slow progress limits the positive impact of ICTs on the region’s productive and competitive capacity. In particular, there are major delays when it comes to innovating and incorporating ICTs into manufacturing and services. Unlike what has occurred in the developed countries, and despite the recognized gains in investments in ICTs, ICT education programs, and advances in e-government and e-health, as well as the gradual spread of digital policies. However, these recognized gains stand in contrast to weaker ones in the digital economy, where slow progress limits the positive impact of ICTs on the region’s productive and competitive capacity. In particular, there are major delays when it comes to innovating and incorporating ICTs into manufacturing and services. Unlike what has occurred in the developed countries, and despite the progress made in the spread of new technologies, there has been a significant impact in the region on productivity and social inclusion.

The development of ICTs produces profound changes in all areas, raising questions about the capacity of the Latin American and Caribbean countries to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the digital revolution and thus move toward economic and social development with equality. One challenge for the region when it comes to ICTs is to keep productive disparities and social inequality from increasing and at the same time avoid squandering the benefits ICTs offer in terms of building a more balanced and equitable productive and social framework.

In this context, it is essential to define integrated policies for systematically addressing initiatives designed to incorporate ICTs in the countries of the region. The new technologies can thus be instruments for increasing output and reducing disparities in the productive structure, as well as fostering greater social inclusion. These policies must include and coordinate measures with regard to training, the promotion of innovation, and capacity building.

ECLAC’s Role

ECLAC has followed and been involved in structural change, innovation, and technological development, with special emphasis on ICTs. For example, it has co-organized the Ministerial Conferences on the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has also served as the technical secretariat of the Regional Plan of Action on the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean, established by 17 countries of the region, in its three versions: eLAC2007, eLAC2010, and eLAC2015.

The eLAC process is a regional action plan, consistent with the Millennium Development Goals and the World Summit on the Information Society, with a long-term vision—extending to 2015—which states that ICTs are tools for economic development and social inclusion. As technical secretariat of this action plan, ECLAC coordinates efforts, monitors progress, publishes information bulletins, and exchanges information among the relevant stakeholders from different sectors.

Likewise, ECLAC serves as the technical secretariat of the Regional Broadband Dialogue, an initiative designed to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices among countries for the purpose of developing broadband policies, especially regarding aspects that affect service fees. At present, 10 countries are participating in this Regional Dialogue: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

To study the broadband market, ECLAC established the aforementioned Regional Broadband Observatory, which began to operate in May 2011. According to ORBA data, in two years the price of broadband connection in Latin America has plummeted while the quality of service has improved, even though there are still significant differences between countries. Based on a sample of nine member countries of the Regional Dialogue, in 2010 the region had very poor Web access, which cost up to 20 times more than in developed countries, but the situation has eased since then. The average cost of service, which was about US$57 for one megabit per second in March 2010, fell to $21 in July 2012.

In addition, the School for Policymakers in Science, Technology, and Innovation was established. Its goal is to strengthen the scientific, technological, and productive capacity of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, and to transfer knowledge and support the training of people who make and manage science and technology policies.

ECLAC has also provided research on the subject, including a study—Las TIC para el crecimiento y la igualdad: renovando las estrategias de la sociedad de la información (ITCs for Growth and Equality: Revamping the Strategies of the Information Society)—that examines the potential of ICTs to move toward a development model characterized by greater innovation and equality. The book Acelerando la revolución digital: banda ancha para América Latina y el Caribe (Accelerating the Digital Revolution: Broadband for Latin America and the Caribbean) emphasizes the pressing need to speed up the development rate of infrastructure, applications, and content so as to be able to incorporate broadband into productive and social activities. Other recent ECLAC publications include ICT in Latin America. A microdata analysis, which helps explain the dynamics of the evolution and revolution of ICTs, and provides evidence on their potential to promote socioeconomic development.

4 Available at: http://www2.unpan.org/egovkb/global_reports/12report.htm.
Using ICTs to Improve Health

Mirta Roses Periago
Director, Pan American Health Organization

In Latin America and the Caribbean, considerable inequalities persist in access to health services, due to a series of factors that limit the possibilities of receiving timely, high-quality medical care. These factors include insufficient human resources and infrastructure, lack of equipment and drugs, the physical and cultural distance between services and the people who need them, and low incomes. Hence, income level, geographical location, and ethnic origin are the determinants of vulnerability and exclusion for millions of households in the region.¹

Major differences also exist between countries with regard to producing, disseminating, accessing, and using scientific knowledge on health. In general, the region produces health information at a lower rate than the world as a whole. People’s access to technology is unequal as well. A study conducted by the International Telecommunication Union in 2010 showed that, on average, 25.2 percent of people in the Americas used the Internet and 13.3 percent of households had Internet access at home.²

The cost-effective, secure use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the health sector has the potential to provide a broad array of social, medical, and economic benefits, and help countries be better equipped to meet today’s challenges. At least seven main challenges need to be addressed in the field of health:³

- Limited access to health services by broad segments of the population, owing to economic, cultural, geographical, and ethnic differences.
- Overlapping epidemiologic profiles that make it necessary to adopt a number of different health strategies simultaneously to cope with the burden of communicable and noncommunicable diseases.
- Insufficient infrastructure and human and budgetary resources.
- The loss of many opportunities to collect and promote countries’ knowledge capital in the public health sector.
- Limited capacity for managing production, classification, preservation, and dissemination of scientific and technical information on health.
- Fragmented, insufficient use of communications (public information and social communication) as a tool for achieving and maintaining health and promoting health strategies.
- Unequal access by vulnerable groups to information on health, with emphasis on gender and ethnic groups.

1 Mirta Roses Periago served as Director of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) from February 2003 to February 2013.

The use of ICTs in the health sector continues to grow. It is driving significant changes in the way the population interacts with health services, changes designed to diminish the challenges mentioned above.

By facilitating access to health systems and health information, the adoption of ICTs has enhanced people’s quality of life. Consequently, it is essential for achieving the Millennium Development Goals—particularly 4a (“Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five”); 5a (“Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio”); and 8f: (“In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications”).

As a result of the Sixth Summit of the Americas, the countries in the region have a new mandate: “to promote the more intensive application of ICTs in health, with a view to improving the efficiency of our countries’ health information systems, including accurate record keeping, and of subregional and regional alert systems for public health events of international concern; the expansion of continuing education programs for health workers and the population; and access to information on health services in those centers and communities that need it the most.”
In this context and taking into account the needs expressed by the countries in the region, the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) developed two regional strategies to improve the health systems of PAHO/WHO member states by using and adopting ICTs. The 2011 Strategy and Plan of Action on eHealth aims to help the countries continually improve public health through the use and application of innovative ICT tools and methodologies. The 2012 Strategy and Plan of Action on Knowledge Management and Communications, for its part, aims to support the continuous improvement of public health in the region through the adoption of knowledge management and communications.

These strategies, which PAHO/WHO has a mandate to implement in the region, are based on a wide range of factors, including:

- Strengthening of health systems; integration, decentralization, and the elimination of obstacles hindering access to services.
- Optimal management of infrastructure and human resources.
- Promotion of community participation and mobilization and strengthening of support networks.
- Establishment of intersectoral and public-private partnerships.
- Strengthening of national science and technology output.
- Introduction of national and regional policies to promote free and equitable access to health information based on scientific data as a human right.
- Equitable access to information, innovation, formation of networks, optimization of resources, and appropriate use of ICTs to achieve inter-operability between the sources and systems of health information regardless of geographic location.
- Health staff throughout the region capable of operating in the “information society.”
- Partnerships for development of competencies and donors that finance projects to democratize access to sources of health information.
- Preservation of documentary and multimedia health sciences resources.
- Optimum circulation of health information to the general public, which allows decision-making favorable to the health status of the populations.

To meet the targets that have been identified for both strategies, it will be necessary to promote and facilitate horizontal cooperation among the countries of the region and share experiences and best practices, regional resources, and lessons learned. It will also be important to identify the pertinent legal aspects; determine the inter-operability of technology systems and adherence to published standards; formulate technical and methodological standards for sharing anonymous data and information and knowledge; promote the exchange, access, and use of evidence-based information through virtual health libraries; and promote collaboration among institutions at both the structural and managerial levels.

PAHO/WHO is taking several actions to accomplish its mandates, such as establishing forums to promote and discuss objectives and strategies for implementing ICT applications for public health in the Americas. Some of these actions include:

- Carrying out a technical consultation on eHealth.
- Forming a technical advisory group, which will address the following areas: infrastructure, information systems, teleHealth and telemedicine, the Internet and access to information, policies, training, risk management and patient safety, unique patient identification and electronic medical registry, standards and inter-operability, legal matters, electronic governance, and monitoring, analysis, and evaluation.

The adoption of these strategies seeks to improve access to and quality of health services through the use of ICTs, the development of digital literacy and training in ICT skills, the availability of information based on scientific evidence and ongoing education, and the implementation of a variety of methods. This will facilitate progress toward the goal of societies that are more informed, equitable, competitive, and democratic—societies in which access to health information is considered a basic right of the people.
Citizen Security and Transnational Organized Crime

Migration and Citizen Security
William Lacy Swing
Director General, International Organization for Migration

What impact does migration have on citizen security in the Americas, and how does citizen security affect migration? Below are some reflections based on the work and experience of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and on the mandates and declarations issued by the Sixth Summit of the Americas.

What impact does migration have on citizen security in the Americas?

To answer this question properly, one has to start from the premise that migration flows, in terms of movements of persons, do not in themselves pose a risk to citizen security. Several arguments reject the validity of views that hold migrants responsible for the decline in security and promote harsher migration policies and measures:

• The great majority of migrants are not law breakers. The criminal records of the countries of the region bear this out.
• Available statistics show that the crime rate of migrants is not significantly higher than that of nationals.
• Data confirm the absence of a clear relationship between the presence of migrants and higher levels of insecurity.

For these and other reasons, it is obvious that the lack of security in some parts of the region cannot be blamed on migrants and that policies restricting and criminalizing migration and migrants with a view to improving citizen security are based on a false cause-effect relationship that runs contrary to human rights. Rather, these attitudes lead to discrimination and exclusion and can serve as justification for violating the rights of migrants.

It is therefore imperative to continue promoting measures at the regional level to prevent migrants from being criminalized and discriminated against. Only then will it be possible to carry out one of the mandates from the Sixth Summit of the Americas: to overcome the marginalization and victimization to which migrants are subject and to protect their human rights, regardless of their immigration status. In this regard, IOM has helped combat the myths and attitudes that criminalize migration and migrants by taking measures to prevent conflict and by promoting greater integration of migrants.

While there is a relationship between migration and citizen security, it is an indirect one and does not exist under all circumstances. Migration can have an indirect impact on citizen security, for example, in two very specific cases:

• The migration of persons who are fleeing from justice. To the extent that these individuals are successful, this can affect citizen security by leading, in the medium or long term, to impunity.
The migration of persons who intend to engage in criminal behavior in the country of destination. They range from those intending to commit minor offenses to those linked to organized crime, who are moving for purposes of arms, ammunition, and drug trafficking; smuggling of migrants; money laundering; trafficking in persons; fraud; or terrorist acts, among other reasons.

In the Americas, as in any part of the world, these people move among all countries. Improving capacity at the border to detect individuals fleeing from justice or intending to commit crimes requires bilateral, subregional, regional, and international cooperation, as well as the generation and use of relevant and timely information and interagency coordination, as indicated at the Sixth Summit. Specifically for that reason, IOM has helped the region restrict the mobility of these individuals by strengthening the capacities of migration and border authorities. It has provided training and technical and technological tools for detecting, for example, counterfeit or altered passports and visas, as well as identifying individuals involved in trafficking in persons or the smuggling of migrants. IOM is also working on the development and installation of automated technological systems to record and analyze entries and departures. Using different regional and subregional platforms and mechanisms, it is fostering the generation and exchange of data and intelligence on migration among the countries of the Americas.

What impact does citizen security have on the migration taking place in the region?

The answer to this question is of special relevance to the region today, primarily because citizen security has direct effects on migration and on migrants.

Citizen insecurity has increasingly become a reason for expelling migrants in the region. In addition to displacements because of armed groups taking over people’s lands, property, and freedom and controlling entire communities, recently some parts of the region have seen displacements of people resulting from the extortion and violence of criminal gangs.

The decline in security caused by these gangs leads to instability in families and among individuals, even those who have not been direct victims of crimes. Consequently, many people decide to migrate to safer communities. As a result, there is a direct cause-effect relationship between crime, citizen insecurity, and migration.

What can be done about these flows? The communities and countries of origin have to make people safer. In the case of the destination countries, the answer remains to be seen. While a humanitarian response, which helps the region restrict the mobility of these individuals by strengthening the capacities of migration and border authorities. It has provided training and technical and technological tools for detecting, for example, counterfeit or altered passports and visas, as well as identifying individuals involved in trafficking in persons or the smuggling of migrants. IOM is also working on the development and installation of automated technological systems to record and analyze entries and departures. Using different regional and subregional platforms and mechanisms, it is fostering the generation and exchange of data and intelligence on migration among the countries of the Americas.

The Sixth Summit

The experience IOM has acquired from its work in the Americas and around the world enables us to affirm that solutions to combat the ravages of transnational organized crime and citizen insecurity cannot come from a single country or only from governments, nor can it come from traditional approaches that place the state at the center and people on a secondary plane, making little effort to protect people and focusing instead on crime control.

Efforts to implement the mandates of the Sixth Summit of the Americas must view migration as a crosscutting issue. It is essential to take due account of the specific characteristics of migrants and to view them in the current context, so that measures can be taken to address their vulnerabilities.

• The migration of persons who intend to engage in criminal behavior in the country of destination. They range from those intending to commit minor offenses to those linked to organized crime, who are moving for purposes of arms, ammunition, and drug trafficking; smuggling of migrants; money laundering; trafficking in persons; fraud; or terrorist acts, among other reasons.

• The high levels of impunity for organized-crime activities and the diversification of such activities have meant, among other things, that organized crime’s involvement in the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons is on the rise. Gangs that initially focused on moving drugs and weapons and on money laundering have turned to smuggling migrants and trafficking in persons and, in some parts of the region, to kidnapping or extorting migrants. The irregular immigration status of migrants makes them more vulnerable, since many of them fear authorities and prefer to remain in hiding rather than run the risk of being deported or of being re-victimized if they report the crimes.

• The migration of unaccompanied children and of migrant women, given their own circumstances and the current context of criminality, makes them especially vulnerable to certain crimes, for example, to child exploitation, illegal adoption, trafficking in persons, and sexual violence, in particular at the hands of organized crime. The Sixth Summit agreed with this assessment and therefore urged that regional efforts be strengthened to prevent the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons—particularly women, children, and adolescents—and that cooperation among states be promoted to that end.

• Given the current situation in much of the Americas, characterized by both large numbers of returned migrants and a strong presence of organized crime, the high number of involuntarily returned migrants with criminal backgrounds can have security implications. These individuals generally find it very difficult to become reintegrated into their communities of origin, as it is difficult for them to find work, avoid discrimination, readjust to the culture, and steer clear of violent conduct. In light of that situation, they run a greater risk of being hurt or of falling into the hands of organized crime.

IOM focuses much of its effort on helping at-risk migrants receive the protection and assistance they need in order to have their human rights guaranteed. To this end, it promotes interagency cooperation as well as binational, subregional, and regional cooperation. Likewise, it carries out activities to raise the awareness of authorities, promoting the rights of migrant persons and the establishment of regulatory frameworks and response mechanisms to provide migrants with protection and assistance and possibly encourage their reintegration. By the same token, IOM promotes the empowerment of migrants, including those in an irregular status, in order to promote reporting of crimes and access to justice in cases where their rights are violated.

Likewise, it is involved in reintegrating victims, providing them with training and opportunities.

• Between 2007 and 2010 alone, the United States deported to other countries in the Americas almost half a million migrants who had been convicted of crimes in the United States.
To this end, consideration must be given, among other things, to the following particular traits of migrants: their mobility; the characteristics, means, and ends of their movement; accessibility to support networks in the transit and destination countries; their experience during the entire migration process (including whether or not they have been victims of crimes); and possibilities for their return. It is important to consider as well other at-risk migrant populations, such as migrants who have voluntarily or involuntarily returned to their countries and those who have been victims of crimes such as robbery, extortion, or kidnapping during the migration process.

Likewise, it is necessary to relate the specific characteristics of migrants to the situation they are facing—for example, their criminalization in some countries. Along the same lines, it is clear that one major threat in the region is that organized crime is focusing increasingly on crimes committed against, and at the expense of, migrants as part of its regular business. Clear signals must be sent that the region is joining forces to combat crime decisively and that it is prepared to fight with equal resolve for the security and human rights of all persons, including migrants and primarily those at greatest risk, regardless of their immigration status.

Hence the enormous importance of the mandates adopted by the Sixth Summit of the Americas, which make very clear the commitment of the countries of the region to move forward decisively, in coordination with one another, to combat trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants—particularly children, adolescents, and women—and to prevent migrants from being marginalized and victimized. IOM reaffirms its commitment to cooperate to fulfill those mandates, placing its capacity and experience in the region at the disposal of the countries of the Americas.

The High Cost of Crime in the Americas

Adam Blackwell
Secretary for Multidimensional Security, Organization of American States

The threat posed by crime in general—and, in particular, by organized crime—currently represents the most pressing challenge to the security of our region’s people and, moreover, of its states. We are facing criminal organizations that act in violation of national borders and jurisdictions, pursuing such criminal activities as drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, money laundering, corruption, kidnapping, and cybercrime. They also use their organizations and economic power to create gangs of criminal youth, to corrupt officials, and to commit, in our region, two-thirds of all the abductions carried out on the planet.

This upswing in crime and burgeoning public insecurity affects society as a whole and severely undermines the quality of life of the people of the hemisphere. It should come as no surprise that, as revealed by public opinion surveys throughout the Americas, people in the region feel afraid, intimidated, and vulnerable to the permanent threat of crime. Every year, almost 200 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean—a third of the region’s total population—are victims, either directly or through members of their family, of some type of criminal act. The 2011 Annual Report issued by the public opinion firm Latinobarómetro shows, on the basis of surveys conducted in 18 countries, that crime is the dominant issue in the region, in each country, and in each segment of society. We can therefore state that the Latin American and Caribbean region is experiencing a moment in which it is difficult to find a single citizen who would say that crime is not important, regardless of the number of victims of which that person is actually aware. Thus, the data suggest that security is the leading topic of the 2010-2020 decade for the Americas, just as unemployment was the topic for the previous decade.

Intentional homicides are the most acute and visible consequence of the problem. In 2011, the hemisphere’s homicide rate stood at an average of 15.6 murders for every 100,000 inhabitants, according to the Inter-American Observatory, which is part of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) and bases its findings on official data from the OAS member countries. In the Americas, a murder is committed every three minutes. Our Observatory’s Death Clock indicates that in 2010, more than 130,000 people fell victim to intentional homicide. The government of Mexico estimates that organized-crime violence is responsible for 150,000 deaths per year in the Western Hemisphere.

Central America, the Caribbean, and South America have the world’s highest murder rates. In many major cities in the region, homicide rates range from 40 to 120 per 100,000 inhabitants. The region’s murder rate is twice the global average, rising as high as five times in some areas, and some of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean report the highest murder rates in the world. Although the region is home to only 8 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for almost half of the planet’s homicides by firearms.
The immense social costs of the epidemic of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean are compounded by the sheer magnitude of the problem. In 2006, Brazil alone had 400 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, a rate that is more than two and a half times the global average. In many countries, the rate of violent crime is even higher. In the case of the Central American region, this spending is equal to 1.5 percent of GDP and is more than the amount spent by the United States on the military. Spending on security services by individuals and companies in the region is also an important factor. In the current decade, almost half have been men between 15 and 29 years of age, in their productive prime. One of the most alarming factors is the economic cost caused by the interruption of productive lives. In the case of Central America, this spending is equal to 1.5 percent of GDP and is more than the amount spent by the United States on the military. Economic studies conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank underscore that if crime rates were lower in certain countries of Central America and the Caribbean, economic growth rates would rise substantially. The IDB has estimated that in the year 2000, the economic impact of crime on small businesses in the region was US$250 billion. Using data from the United Nations Development Programme, it came up with a lower figure: 7.7 percent of GDP.

Citizen Security and Transnational Organized Crime

Migrant flows and transnational organized crime are a major concern for the region. The flow of illegal goods and services in the Americas is an estimated US$75 billion per year. The high cost of illegal trade is directly attributable to the high cost of security services. In the United States, for example, the cost of security services has increased by 17 percent per year, while the cost of education has increased by 7 percent per year. As a result of crime, the countries of the region are plunged into a complex vicious circle, in which insecurity is both the cause and the effect of conditions of precariousness, backwardness, and underdevelopment. Poorer segments of the population can spend their entire lives under the threat of violence, while those with greater resources hide behind the walls of fortified condominiums, protected by armed private security guards. Insecurity discourages investment, dissuades participation, increases mistrust and perceptions of impunity, affects the electoral process, and encourages young people to drop out of school. And, at the same time, unemployment, precarious conditions of employment, migration processes, and the general breakdown of everyday life serve to heighten insecurity.

The complexity of these topics makes it difficult to identify the steps needed to address the problems and at the same time points to the close ties that exist between security, governance, and development. It clearly reveals why topics related to public security are of such importance and why they must be addressed comprehensively on the inter-American agenda.
The Drug Problem in the Americas
José Miguel Insulza
Secretary General, Organization of American States

Chapter III
Issues Under Debate

In the Americas, approximately 45 percent of all the cocaine, about half the heroin and a quarter of all marijuana sold worldwide is consumed. The consumption of cocaine paste, crack, inhalants, amphetamines and the abuse of legal drugs has increased.

This consumption of prohibited drugs creates an illegal business in our hemisphere that generates some 151 billion dollars in drug retail alone.

This illegal activity has led to the rise of giant transnational criminal networks, which have expanded their activities to include, in addition to the production and sale of controlled substances, the illegal trafficking and sale of arms, piracy and smuggling, human trafficking, the control and exploitation of prostitution, theft, illegal mining, kidnapping and extortion, and the smuggling of migrants and organs, among other criminal activities.

In some of our countries, the activity of these criminals has resulted in massacres, attacks carried out by assassins, torture and deaths that have raised the death toll to hundreds of thousands of people.

Moreover, it has led to the corruption of public and private officials at various levels and caused damage to our economies and institutions that, in many cases, jeopardizes our democratic governance.

Although these are realities that affect each country differently, we are united by our concern over the problem. The relationship between drugs and violence is one of the main causes of fear amongst our citizens and has contributed to making security one of the most worrying issues for the citizens of the entire hemisphere.

This situation must be faced with greater realism and effectiveness if we want to move forward successfully. All of us who hold public responsibilities owe it to the millions of women and men, young and old, mothers and fathers, girls and boys who today feel threatened to find clear answers and effective public policies to confront this scourge.

The Heads of State and Government of the Americas, aware of this, moved forward in Cartagena in April 2012, when they gave an explicit mandate to the Organization of American States, to “Analyze the results of the current policy (on drugs) in the Americas and explore new approaches to strengthen this struggle and to become more effective.”

The report, “The Drug Problem in the Americas,” presented to the Leaders of the Hemisphere by way of his Excellency the President of Colombia, who was the Chair of the Summit of the Americas that commissioned it, is the result of that effort. In it, we have thoroughly examined the available and updated information about the size and characteristics of the consumption and the business of illicit drugs in our hemisphere, including their effects on the security of our citizens, on the health of our peoples, and on the quality of our institutions and their servants. To do so we have received valuable contributions from public servants, private specialists, academic experts and social and political leaders from the entire hemisphere that contributed with their opinions, their inputs in specific areas and, at all times, with their experience and goodwill.
We have tried, in this report, not to silence or hide anything. To show the problem just as it is and how it manifests itself in different ways in our various countries and sub-regions. To show the volume of money that changes hands and who benefits from it. To show how it erodes our social organization and how it undermines the health of our people, the quality of our governments and even our democracy.

The first part of this report, the Analytical Report, offers, in first place, a definition of the problem, an explanation of how we approached its analysis and an examination of the reasons that led society to worry about the consumption of certain substances and decide to put controls on them, due to the effects of drugs on human health.

Next we follow the entire process of drugs in the region, the part of the world in which all of its stages are present in a dominant way: cultivation, production, distribution and the final sale of controlled substances. In each stage we review the various forms this activity assumes, as well as its environmental impact and the reaction of the State, its implications and its limitations.

We also examined the consumption of the different drugs in our countries, their effects on social exclusion and the exercise of human rights, the possible forms of treatment and prevention practiced today and, again, the reaction of our States.

There are two aspects connected with the process of the production, trafficking and consumption of drugs that deserve special attention.

The first is the so-called “drug economy.” Our report contains an examination of the profits generated in each stage of the process, concluding that, while all profit in the process, the greatest profits are produced in the final stage, the sale to consumers.

The second aspect is an examination of the various forms of criminal violence associated with the different stages in the value chain of the illegal drug economy, including that which takes place in the consumption of these substances.

On this point, we carefully considered the possible reasons why this violence takes on greater intensity and virulence in some countries and, in particular, why the greatest violence is not generated where the greatest profit is generated. The most lethal criminality does not coincide with the greatest profit-making. Probably, then, there are other factors, such as greater or lesser institutional strength in our countries and the greater impunity enjoyed by criminals, which promotes the violence linked to drugs.

Finally, we analyze the legal and regulatory alternatives to address the problem, in particular their origins and characteristics, current trends in decriminalization, reduction of penalties and legalization, the potential costs and benefits of these alternatives and the review of other legal alternatives.

The Analytical Report provides a succinct summary of the current reality of the drug problem.

The Report on Scenarios for the Drug Problem in the Americas 2013 – 2025, is an examination of the various paths that the phenomenon could take in the coming years.

We are aware that there is not just one possible future but many alternative or combined futures; because the complexity of the drug problem gives rise to different visions or points of view, which are expressed in many debates. And, on that basis, various policy options can be adopted with very different consequences.

Starting from that premise, a group of people, specialists and participants who have dealt with the drug problem from very different angles, have set forth four possibilities on what the “drug problem” in the Americas could become in the future.

None of them represents what will happen or what we want to happen, but all of them could come to pass if certain events take place and if some political decisions are taken. To understand these possibilities, to analyze their causes and effects, and to draw conclusions about them, is a task that we consider not just useful but necessary for our individual and collective reflections on the problem.

Three of the four scenarios discussed – “Together”, “Pathways” and “Resilience” – describe alternative futures depending on the relative weight placed on institutional strengthening, experimentation with legal changes or the ability to react to the problem from the community. The fourth, “Disruption,” warns of what might happen if we fail in the short term to arrive at a shared vision that allows us to unite our efforts to address the problem, while at the same time respecting our diversity.

From each of these scenarios a variety of collective and multilateral opportunities and challenges emerge that should be leading factors in the subsequent discussion. With drugs, as with any complex social problem, there is a wide range of motivations and beliefs that influence the social fabric. That’s why we believe that the scenarios are a good starting point for our leaders and ultimately, our people, to arrive at collective and sustainable policies in the midst of diversity.

By mandating us to prepare this report, the Heads of State of our hemisphere gave us a great responsibility. At the same time, they prescribed very precise limits for our response to it. That is why we lay out facts that will assist in decision-making, but do not propose solutions. That it is up to our leaders, who will have a firm basis for their deliberations in future debates.

However, we have allowed ourselves to draw some general conclusions, found at the end of the Analytical Report:

First, although the drug problem in the Americas is expressed in a single process, it allows for different treatments in each of its phases and in the countries in which they take place.

The health problems associated with substance abuse are certainly present in all our countries, as there is evidence of drug use in all of them. However, although the increase in consumption in South America is alarming, the use of drugs is still greater in the countries in the north of North America, which, together with Europe, continues to be the main destination for drug trafficking from our hemisphere.

By contrast, the impact on the economy, social relations, security and democratic governance is greater in the countries where cultivation, production and transit take place, located in South America, Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean.

Second, while some countries have greater resources and stronger institutions to better address damages related to the illicit market and illegal drug use, others suffer a clear institutional weakness that leads to a practical inability to address the problem.

The links between drugs and violence in our countries are complex, with greater impact on those countries in which the State is not able to deliver effective responses.

Those countries in which criminal activity reaches more intense levels of violence and cruelty are also those where the geographical reach of institutions tends to be limited, which suffer from a lack of coordination and institutional articulation, limited financial and human resources, and a lack of information needed to guide the definition and implementation of security policies.

Moreover, there exists, a situation of widespread impunity, which explains the existence of an equally widespread culture of lack of respect for the State. In the context of this lack of respect for the State, a vicious circle is created in which the community decides not to use the institutions (crimes are not reported, disputes
are resolved privately, people take justice into their own hands) because the police do not chase offenders, courts do not deliver justice, and prisons do not rehabilitate and often serve as a haven for criminals who continue to operate as such from behind bars.

We recognize that there are probably other conditions that help explain the rule of crime and violence in some of our countries. That our individual histories as nations, our cultures and idiosyncrasies and especially the situations of poverty and social inequality that characterize some countries, are also present, in a decisive way, in explaining this phenomenon. However, it seems equally undeniable that at the core of any solution there will always be a need for formal institutions that effectively ensure public security and truly ensure the welfare and prosperity of all.

Third, drug consumption requires a public health approach in all of our countries, with more resources and more programs in order to succeed.

National, international and hemispheric policies on drugs have gradually adopted the view of dependence as a chronic, relapsing disease, which requires a health-oriented approach that integrates a wide range of policies. These include promoting healthy lifestyles, protecting users with measures to limit the availability of psychoactive substances, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration.

Drug treatment should be present at all levels of general and specialized care in the health system, with special emphasis on early detection and timely intervention at the primary care level. In our report we show that there is a significant gap between the vision of public health and care services for problems of psychoactive substance consumption in many of our countries.

Fourth, addressing the drug problem requires a multi-pronged approach, with great flexibility with an understanding of different realities and, above all, the belief that to be successful we must maintain unity in diversity.

Greater flexibility could certainly lead to acceptance of the possibility of changes in national legislation or to promoting changes in international law. From there, if one accepts the fundamental notion that drug use is not a criminal act, then users should not be subject to punishment, but to care and rehabilitation.

Also, it is important to recognize that there is an ongoing debate about the legalization or de-penalization of marijuana with initiatives underway in some of our countries, as well as a disposition to deal with the issue that does not exist with respect to other drugs, such as heroin, cocaine and amphetamines, where the proposals for legalization or de-penalization are largely rejected.

Naturally none of these changes should put in doubt the advances made thus far in terms of collective action on drugs in our hemisphere, but rather should build on this basis, more realistic policies, which consider the needs of the individual and also the needs of the whole.

In that balance between the individual and the collective, between national sovereignty and multilateral action, we have based our coexistence and all the associative structures that we have created in the course of our histories as nations that are independent but united and supportive in the international arena.

By responding to the explicit mandate that the Sixth Summit of the Americas conferred upon the OAS, we are encouraged by the sincere aspiration that the report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” it is not a conclusion but the beginning of a long awaited discussion.

Drugs in the Americas —
Remember Albert Einstein
Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith
Professor and Senior Vice President, York College

Generally, individuals and national and international policymakers and practitioners value consistency in policies and programs. But sometimes there are policies and practices that, when reviewed in the context of input and outcomes over time, call to mind one of Einstein’s prescient observations: “Insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, but expecting different results.”

Overall, the inputs and outcomes of our hemispheric policies and practices vis-à-vis the illegal narcotics phenomenon over the last four decades definitely suggest that we remember Einstein’s admonition. I emphasize narcotics phenomenon, rather than simply the production or trafficking aspects that often headline media and popular discourse. Quite importantly, we are dealing with a phenomenon that is both transnational and multidimensional. As such, adopting a holistic approach—and not a segmented one—is not just desirable, but necessary. This holds true whether one is examining a single nation, a region, or the entire hemisphere.

Some years ago, I proposed a holistic approach in originating the concept of “geonarcotics.” It was outlined in 1994 in International Journal, Canada’s leading international affairs magazine, and later applied empirically in a study called Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege. It suggests that narcotics, geography, power, and politics interact dynamically; that the phenomenon of drugs is multidimensional, with four main problem areas (production, consumption/abuse, trafficking, and money laundering); that these give rise to actual and potential threats to the security of states; and that drug operations and the activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among various state and non-state actors. Crucially, the geonarcotics approach does not view the “war on drugs” purely as a military matter. Incidentally, although my empirical application of the concept has been to the Caribbean, the concept has broader applicability, and not just to the Americas.

Sadly, our hemisphere’s landscape and seascape provide considerable evidence of the power of non-state actors, the damage to public security, and the political perversions of the geonarcotics milieu. In the context of that milieu, and focusing on the Caribbean for now, crime continues to be the primary public security challenge, with homicides dramatizing the fear and insecurity. Thankfully, recently years have brought reductions in the number of homicides in Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, and in a few other places. The challenge is to sustain those reductions and get reductions elsewhere.

1 A political scientist and specialist on security, drugs, and crime matters, Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith is Professor of Political Science and Provost and Senior Vice President at York College of The City University of New York.
2 Published in 1997 by Penn State University Press.
From Cartagena Forward

Issues Under Debate

Thus, governments and regional and international organizations have made considerable investments in counter-narcotics policy, programs, and resources in the Caribbean and throughout the Americas. Over past decades there have been numerous individual, bilateral, and multilateral countermeasures, manifested through thoughtful policies and programs. Yet, an overall assessment of inputs and outcomes would reveal no significant and sustained reduction in illicit production, trafficking, consumption/abuse, and money laundering that has lasted at least a decade. Neither has there been an appreciable attenuation of many nations’ dire public security situation, whether caused by well-organized or loosely affiliated non-state actors.

This is where Einstein becomes relevant. The absence of significant and sustained changes is linked existentially to the predominance of “the war on drugs” approach. Yes, there have been nuances and pushback against this approach within and outside the United States over the years. But these have been neither potent nor successful enough to create the necessary philosophical and policy adaptation for the pursuit of alternative paradigms. The Sixth Summit of the Americas created an important policy space for just this type of shift. What I call “The Cartagena Moment” should be seized and the momentum sustained.

Doing this should not entail abandoning multidimensional and multilateral countermeasures. And, it should continue the use of military and law enforcement assets in combating aspects of the phenomenon. However, it should embrace selective decriminalization as a supplementary element in the counter-narcotics matrix. Otherwise, two decades hence policymakers and pundits will have occasion again to invoke Einstein: “Insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, but expecting different results.”

Jamaica’s National Security Minister, Peter Bunting, made a startling revelation in his nation’s parliament in July 2012, during the budget debate: 16,537 Jamaicans had been murdered between January 2000 and June 2012. He noted: “This represents an enormous cost to the society in terms of foregone economic development as well as the fear, grief, pain and misery inflicted on victims, their families and communities. Whilst we celebrate many accomplishments of our 50 years of independence, our performance with regard to the safety and security of our citizens leaves a great deal to be desired.” The homicide numbers and anniversaries may differ—though Trinidad and Tobago also celebrated its 50th year of independence from Britain this year—but the Minister’s remarks are relevant to all Caribbean nations.

Troubling, too, are the significant use of weapons in murders and the daring nature of some crimes. Space permits just a few examples. One, in pristine St. Lucia, was the attempted assassination of a Jamaican-born jurist: Magistrate Ann Marie Smith, known to be tough on drug dealers. The incident occurred in the capital, Castries, in broad daylight in April 2010, as Smith was heading to work with her then 4-year-old daughter. Luckily, the gunmen were inept and neither Smith nor her daughter was injured, but the gunmen were never found. The following year Smith left for Belize, where she now is Chief Magistrate.

St. Lucia was also the place of a retaliatory early-morning home invasion in October 2010 that resulted in the murder of an 8-year old child asleep in her bed and the maiming of her sister, leading to the amputation of one of her arms. In August 2011, in the Dominican Republic, authorities arrested four people, including a prominent hotel owner, for the murder of José Silvestre, publisher of the magazine La voz de lo verdad (The Voice of Truth) and host of a radio program. Silvestre had been reporting stories on alleged criminal links of the businessman and his associates. Combating the drug phenomenon generally, and fighting crime particularly, has some negative consequences. One of these is overpopulated and unhealthy prisons. In recent years, prisoners in Guyana, Puerto Rico, Barbados, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica have rioted over their conditions.

Rampant crime has aided the loss of political power in some places: St. Lucia in November 2011 and the Bahamas in May 2012 are examples. The December 2011 electoral change in Jamaica was of a higher (or lower) geopolitical order, in that it reflected popular outrage over a milieu in which the case of drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke dramatized not just perversion of the political order, but challenge to the sovereignty of the state. In addition, security officials have been removed when considered ineffective. Cases in point include St. Lucia, with Commissioner Ausbert Regis in May 2010; Suriname, with Commissioner Delano Braam in June 2011; and Puerto Rico, where Superintendent José Figueroa Sancha “retired” in July 2011.

The transnational and multidimensional character of the phenomenon plus the small size and vulnerability of Caribbean states necessitate security collaboration to cope with the problem. In this respect, there is the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)—a partnership involving the United States and the Caribbean to reduce drug trafficking, increase public security, and promote social justice. In October 2011, Guyana hosted the second meeting of the CBSI Commission, which coordinates the various programs of the technical working groups. At the meeting, the United States announced a planned investment of US$77 million in 2012 for CBSI projects. In October 2012, the Commission held its third meeting in St. Kitts and Nevis. Of course, other collaboration exists. For instance, in September 2011, Jamaica’s then National Security Minister, Dwight Nelson, and the country’s army and police chiefs visited Cuba and signed several counter-narcotics agreements. Later, they visited Honduras and signed similar agreements and discussed the maritime dispute between the two countries.
Cuba and Summits in the Americas

Richard E. Feinberg
Professor, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego

Cuba was a deeply divisive issue at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago (2009) and again in Cartagena (2012). In Cartagena, the Latin American and Caribbean nations pressed hard for Cuba to be admitted to inter-American summity. Several governments, including Brazil and Argentina, have stated that they will not attend the next scheduled Summit (Panama, 2015) unless Cuba is present, which is to say that unless the Cuba issue can be defused, the cycle of inter-American Summits begun in Miami (1994) will come to a contentious close. In Cartagena, the United States and Canada insisted that these Summits were conclaves for democratically elected governments only. Is there a way out of this impasse?

Some Background

When the Clinton administration initiated inter-American summity, it chose to invite only “democratically elected” leaders. As Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council at the time, I claim some credit for inserting that predicate into the speech Vice President Al Gore delivered in Mexico City, where the Summit invitations were announced. I must confess: the intention was to send a clear message to any of the hemisphere’s democratically elected leaders who might be flirting with authoritarianism that one penalty for failing to play by democratic rules would be exclusion from regional diplomacy and, in turn, the loss of its benefits. At the time, the principal target of that message was President Alberto Fujimori of Peru, who had earlier violated democratic norms. The implied exclusion of Cuba was an afterthought.

In the 1990s, the main thrusts of the Summits were to help consolidate still-fragile democracies and to promote prosperity through freer trade and investment flows within the region. No way could Cuba have constructively participated in those discussions. And for Cuba to sign a communiqué asserting the values of representative democracy and open markets would have been pure hypocrisy. Moreover, Cuba’s signature would have badly diluted the credibility of Summit declarations.

In the early 1990s, Cuba was still emerging from its ill-fated integration into the economic and security systems of the Soviet Union and was not yet well integrated into Latin American and Caribbean regional diplomacy and institutions.  

1 Richard E. Feinberg is professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. His four decades of engagement in inter-American relations spare government service (in the White House, Department of State, and U.S. Treasury), numerous Washington, D.C.-based public policy institutes, the Peace Corps (Chile), and now academia. He is also book reviewer for the Western Hemisphere section of Foreign Affairs magazine.

The shift in the agenda opens the door to Cuban participation without hypocrisy. The Cartagena Summit mandates concentrate on five thematic areas: poverty elimination, infrastructure, citizen security and transnational organized crime, access to technology, and disaster risk prevention and mitigation. These are, for the most part, less ideologically charged issues. It is perfectly imaginable for Cuba to agree to pragmatic consensus measures aimed at, for example, reducing poverty through better access to health and education, fighting organized crime, and sharing experiences in disaster prevention and relief.

Over the last two decades, Cuba has emerged from its diplomatic isolation to enter into normal diplomatic relations with nearly all the nations of the hemisphere. Cuba has commercial relations with a very wide range of countries, and hosts direct investments from many European economies, Canada, China, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil, among others. Cuba has also initiated a process of gradual economic reform, opening space to non-state actors (small-scale enterprise, private farmers, independent cooperatives). Furthermore, Cuba is a participant in a number of regional forums, including the Group of Rio and the Ibero-American Summits, and will be the venue for the newly formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2014. The change in Cuban leadership is also relevant: whereas Fidel Castro was a dramatic personality whose mere presence could divert attention, his successor, President Raul Castro, is less charismatic or disruptive, and often prefers that Cuba be represented at international meetings by one of his vice presidents.

Summitry and the OAS

The inaugural Miami Summit was convened and organized by the United States, by a president on behalf of other presidents and heads of state. In Miami, as in subsequent Summits, the leaders tasked regional organizations—including the Organization of American States (OAS), a forum of their foreign ministers—to implement Summit initiatives. Over the years, leaders have bestowed upon the OAS the important tasks of serving as Summit secretariat, overseeing follow-up and implementation of Summit initiatives, and negotiating

Summit declarations. Yet, Summits remain the domain of leaders—Heads of State and Government, not of foreign ministries or the OAS. Institutionally, Summits and the OAS are two distinct entities. Hence, the OAS Charter, which proclaims that “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region,” does not necessarily apply to summity.

Cuba has always been and remains a member of the OAS, although since 1962 it has not enjoyed the full rights of “active participation.” But this is not germane, as status in the OAS is not a pre-condition for participation in the separate institution of inter-American summity.

At the Quebec Summit (2001)—at the apex of hemispheric consensus on representative democracy and prior to September 11, 2001—leaders declared that “respect for the democratic system” is “at the same time, a goal and a shared commitment” and “an essential condition of our presence at this and future Summits.” Like all Summit declarations, this statement is “soft” diplomacy, not a ratified “hard law” treaty. Just as the leaders in Quebec decided among themselves to issue this declaration, leaders can, either by explicit statement or undeclared action, amend or dissolve it.

From the Cuban perspective, this distinction between the OAS and inter-American summity is vital. Cuba has repeatedly expressed its lack of interest in resuming active participation in the OAS. In contrast, Raúl Castro has said that, if invited, Cuba would welcome the opportunity to participate in inter-American summity.

Pathways Forward: Gradualism and Confidence-building Measures

There is time before the next Summit in 2015 to begin a process of gradual incorporation of Cuba into the Summit of the Americas process. These initial steps would serve as confidence-building measures, to test whether Cuban representatives acted in a constructive or disruptive manner. For Cuba, its government could determine whether its national interest was served by participation in the process.

Summit implementation engages a wide range of follow-up mechanisms, including ministerial meetings and working groups. As their purpose is to implement the decisions taken by leaders, these gatherings can be considered technical, not political, events.

The hosts of select Summit follow-up meetings, in consultation with other governments and the OAS Secretary General, could extend invitations to pertinent Cuban officials. The “troika” of recent and upcoming Summit hosts (Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Panama) might play a facilitating or bridging role. In the first instance, Cuban experts might be invited to attend as observers. Over time and as mutual confidence builds, invitations could propose active participation.

In some instances, at the invitation of the chair, Cuban representatives could share their nation’s successful experiences, for example in disaster preparation and mitigation regarding tropical storms. Cuba also has much to say about poverty alleviation. In other instances, Cuban representatives could learn from the experience of other nations, for example in expanding energy and communications infrastructure.

Whether Cuban participation at such a technical level would be sufficient to defuse tensions and clear the pathway toward Panama remains to be seen. Over the next several years, it is also possible that further changes within Cuba could facilitate deeper participation in inter-American summity. We may also see evolution in the foreign policies of the United States and Canada.
Statement by the President of Colombia at the Close of the Sixth Summit of the Americas

Juan Manuel Santos

As President of the Sixth Summit of the Americas, I would like to express my satisfaction at the results of the meetings that we have held over the last two days here in Cartagena.

The active participation of the Heads of State and Government and the quality of our discussions allowed us to adopt a number of commitments on the issues with which our work was concerned.

We reiterate that the search for development and prosperity are core aims of the Summits of the Americas process.

We had two options: to focus solely on the wording of a declaration, as has so often happened, or to talk frankly about the issues that unite, as well as about those that divide us.

This Sixth Summit has been the summit of dialogue and sincerity.

Dialogue entails discussing the issues on which we agree, but also addressing those on which our positions differ.

On this occasion we showed that no topic is off the table.

We discussed all the topics in a polite, direct, and candid manner.

Putting aside long silences will bring benefits in the short and long terms, as well as strengthening integration and convergence of interests in the region.

Respect for, and tolerance of, differences proves that we are a mature region with enormous potential for carrying out ambitious projects such as those set out in the mandates of the Sixth Summit, whose leitmotif was Connecting the Americas: Partners for Prosperity.

Most countries are in favor of Cuba’s participation in the Summits of the Americas process and vowed to make that goal a reality as of the next Summit.
On the issue of the Malvinas Islands, all the participants in the Summit have set out their positions of consensus in declarations issued by the Organization of American States. On this occasion, the discussions took place without modifying those decisions and the vast majority of countries called for a peaceful settlement to this dispute.

We, the region’s leaders, held an invaluable discussion on the global drug problem. We agreed on the need to analyze the results of the current policy in the Americas and to explore new approaches to strengthen this struggle and to become more effective. We have issued the OAS a mandate to that end.

The Sixth Summit afforded greater opportunities for the participation of, and dialogue with, social actors.

Cartagena hosted forums for young business leaders, workers, civil society, and indigenous peoples, and raised the level of interlocution with governments thanks to the participation of two presidents and a significant number of foreign ministers.

Cartagena was the setting for the first Business Summit of the Americas, an initiative of the Colombian private sector that had the endorsement of the Colombian Government as well as technical support from the Inter-American Development Bank.

This forum provided an opportunity for constructive dialogue between a number of Heads of State and Government and a sizable gathering of entrepreneurs in the Americas. The interest that this initiative generated warrants consideration to repeating the exercise on a regular basis.

Five mandates came out of the Summit:

First, natural disasters.

We agreed to mitigate their social, economic, and environmental impact by allocating resources and designing strategies geared to adaptation, risk management, and the creation of efficient prevention and response mechanisms.

Second, citizen security.

This is a matter of priority for ensuring the quality of life of all citizens in the Americas.

We agreed to strengthen cooperation and coordination as fundamental tools for combating violence, corruption, and transnational organized crime in all its forms.

Third, integration of physical infrastructure.

This is a critical priority for advancing the development and well-being of our peoples. The execution of projects with a view to establishing hemisphere-wide road, rail, and electrical networks will make the Americas a pole of global development and growth.

Fourth, use of information and communication technologies.

We agreed to promote education, share educational materials, and empower each student in their education and in overcoming social and economic barriers.

We adopted the goal of designing and deepening public policies that would enable us to apply ICTs to education, healthcare, innovation, entrepreneurship, productivity, competitiveness, and the rise of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.

Fifth, poverty eradication, inequality, and the search for equity.

This is the most important mandate of all. Everything we do to improve infrastructure, education, security, and disaster prevention underpins poverty elimination policies.

Establishing inclusive social policies that foster decent, dignified, and productive employment will be the priority for the region.

Implementing the mandates will require regular dialogue with the inter-American institutions and agencies that support the Summits of the Americas process.

I would like to express my appreciation to President Ricardo Martinelli of Panama for his generous offer to organize the Seventh Summit of the Americas in his country.

The spirit of this Summit was one of building bridges and connecting with one another, in order to turn economic prosperity into social prosperity. People should always come first.

We reiterate our commitment to moving forward together toward the consolidation of a hemisphere of respect that lives with its differences and develops a dialogue of equals.

We want one America, an America more united and more prosperous.
MANDATES ARISING FROM THE SIXTH SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Americas, resolve:

INTEGRATION OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AMERICAS

1. To reaffirm that the promotion and further development of physical infrastructure projects at the national, subregional, and regional levels are priorities for the public policies and development strategies of our countries, as appropriate, which contribute to sustainable development, social inclusion, and increased trade.
2. To promote the exchange of experiences and the participation of the public and private sectors, taking into account current and future national, subregional, and regional physical infrastructure programs and projects that connect and integrate the Americas, which should, in accordance with our respective needs and full respect for our domestic laws, contribute to the development of synergies of national physical infrastructure agendas.
3. To examine financing mechanisms with a view to encouraging and strengthening the further involvement of national, subregional, regional, and international financial institutions, and that of the private sector, in projects to promote physical integration of the Americas as well as horizontal cooperation between our countries to that end.
4. To promote, on the basis of the corresponding national policies and regulatory frameworks, compatibility and harmonization of institutional regulations that facilitate investment in infrastructure in the Americas.
5. To promote and/or optimize electrical interconnection and foster the development of renewable energy generation in the Americas.
6. To encourage the transfer of available technologies in energy under voluntary and mutually agreed terms, as well as the exchange of best practices.
7. To foster increased connection of telecommunication networks in general, including fiber optic and broadband, among the region’s countries, as well as international connections, to improve connectivity, increase the dynamism of communications between the nations of the Americas, as well as reduce international data transmission costs, and, thus, promote access, connectivity, and convergent services to all social sectors in the Americas.

POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND INEQUITY

1. To promote and encourage comprehensive, timely, and quality public policies on:
   a. Early childhood care, education, and development.
   b. Protecting children from economic exploitation and from any tasks that may interfere with their education and integral development, according to the principle of the effective abolition of child labor, which is contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998); as well as preventing and eradicating the worst forms of child labor according to Convention 182 of the ILO (1999)
   c. Raising awareness about the adverse effects of adolescent pregnancies on the integral development of the adolescent and their offspring, as well as fostering their health and well-being.
2. To combat poverty, extreme poverty, hunger, inequality, inequity, and social exclusion through public policies that promote decent, dignified, and productive work; sustained economic growth; income growth; and access to comprehensive and quality education, health care, and housing, in order to achieve sustainable development with social justice in the Americas.

3. To ensure equal access to primary and secondary education for all, to promote improvement in the quality of education at all levels, increased access to tertiary, technical, and vocational education, as soon as possible, with particular attention to vulnerable groups and those with special education needs, using, inter alia, the modalities of distance learning, and to promote strengthening of literacy programs.

4. To foster greater international exchange of students, in order to provide them with the greatest possible learning opportunities.

5. To reaffirm our commitment to advance towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and promote the financing of projects and programs to disseminate best practices in the communities that are most behind.

6. To deepen inter-American cooperation in the area of development and social protection with a view to strengthening human and institutional capacity-building efforts, and generating a skilled workforce, with a gender perspective and giving attention to vulnerable groups.

7. To promote economic growth with equity and social inclusion by strengthening cooperatives, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, including cultural industries, in addition to grassroots economic initiatives and other production units, innovation, and competitiveness in the countries of the Americas.

8. To strengthen public-private partnerships, and partnerships with all stakeholders, to promote the reduction of poverty and inequality as well as the economic and social development of the communities in which they operate.

9. To promote greater investment in, and access to, research, technological innovation, and capacity-building in order to strengthen and ensure a sustainable, comprehensive, inclusive, and competitive agro-food sector that would contribute to food security and the reduction of poverty and inequity, particularly in marginalized rural and urban areas.

10. To reaffirm our support for the objectives set out in the Declaration of the Decade of the Americas for the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (2006-2016) and its Plan of Action, by promoting equal opportunity for, and nondiscrimination of, persons with disabilities through their participation in our countries’ social, political, economic, and cultural development processes, in order to ensure their well-being and the full enjoyment and exercise of all their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

11. To advance in strengthening the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of older persons through promotion of public policies, programs, and services, thus safeguarding their dignity, their physical, mental and social well-being, and their quality of life, bearing in mind efforts underway at the inter-American level to draft a legally binding instrument for the protection of the rights of older persons and consideration of the issue at the international level.

12. To develop comprehensive public policies, as appropriate, to strengthen social inclusion of migrants in a bid to overcome marginalization, victimization, and poverty and, regardless of their immigration status, protect their human rights.

13. To promote the gradual formalization of the informal economy, recognizing its heterogeneous and multidimensional nature, through policies such as registration and information systems to facilitate formalization and access to credit, social protection mechanisms, improvement of occupational health and safety, strengthening of labor inspection, and effective enforcement of labor laws.¹

14. To take specific steps to improve access to quality education for girls, especially in rural areas, as well as promoting improved capacities of schools, teachers, civil society, and communities to reduce the barriers to regular attendance for women and girls.

15. To take action on the conditions that negatively impact the health of our people taking into account the 2011 World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health.

16. To develop and strengthen, as appropriate, strategies and policies on youth employment, as well as to promote technical and vocational education and training opportunities in order to improve and increase the entry of young people into the labor market, the quality and stability of their jobs, as well as their social protection.

17. To give priority to nutrition, particularly child nutrition, in the fight against poverty, hunger, and inequality and, in this context, we underscore the importance of joint efforts by the public and private sectors, civil society, and other social actors.

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT

1. To reaffirm that disaster risk management is a priority within our national public policies and development strategies.

2. To prioritize the allocation of resources and the design of financial protection strategies, as appropriate, aimed at mitigating the social, economic, and environmental impact of disasters, with support from, inter alia, subregional, regional, and international financial institutions.

3. To strengthen our institutional platforms for disaster risk management, in collaboration with subregional, regional, and international mechanisms, through strategies of mutual assistance and partnership, in order to facilitate joint research, the exchange of knowledge, information, best practices, lessons learned in this area, and technology transfer under mutually agreed terms.

4. To strengthen regional and subregional instruments as well as existing initiatives in the area of disaster risk reduction and management and humanitarian assistance as well as coordination and cooperation mechanisms to generate synergies, underscoring the importance of coordination.

5. To work with subregional, regional, and international financial institutions with the aim to strengthen financing mechanisms for adaptation to climate change, mitigation, recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, with a view to reducing and managing disaster risk and strengthening the resilience of communities and nations that are vulnerable to or affected by disasters.

6. To designate, where needed, and support, where already in existence, national and institutional focal points to promote more-efficient coordination among agencies of the inter-American system, international and regional organizations and entities, and subregional mechanisms, and to promote the use of on-line tools in this context, in order to bring a more rapid and effective response to disasters and catastrophes.

¹ In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the definition of “informal economy” is broad enough to encompass certain activities that are illegal but which, nevertheless, have an impact on the local economy. Taking into account their domestic circumstances, St. Vincent and the Grenadines joins consensus on this paragraph with the understanding that “informal economy” refers wholly and solely to activities that are legally sanctioned.
ACCESS TO AND USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

1. To foster participation and collaboration between the public and private sectors, social actors and communities to promote initiatives, in accordance with corresponding domestic legal frameworks, which enable our educational centers and health facilities, including in remote and rural areas, to enjoy equitable and affordable access to, and use of, expanded broadband, information and communication technologies (ICTs), and computers.

2. To promote and establish, as appropriate, programs to encourage the training of teachers for the inclusion and effective use of ICTs in education, and for the production and sharing of relevant educational materials in each country.

3. To promote the more intensive application of ICTs in health, with a view to improving the efficiency of our countries’ health information systems, including accurate record keeping, and of subregional and regional alert systems for public health events of international concern; the expansion of continuing education programs for health workers and the population; and access to information on health services in those centers and communities that need it the most.

4. To promote the development, coordination, and implementation of strategies and projects, as appropriate, for expanding access to, and use of, ICTs with the support and participation of international organizations, the private sector, social actors, and communities, in order to achieve greater social inclusion and improve the quality of life of our peoples.

5. To promote and support, as appropriate, initiatives that expand the contribution of ICTs to innovation, entrepreneurship, productivity, competitiveness, the emergence of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, and economic growth, within the framework of sustainable development.

6. To strengthen our efforts to make government affairs more transparent and accountable by supporting ICT initiatives and projects that enhance citizen engagement and provide capacity building for the creation, accessibility, and sharing of on-line information and knowledge, as permitted by law.

7. To promote transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption initiatives in the private sector, with the support of ICT programs, activities, and projects, as appropriate, to improve the capacity of stakeholders to participate and access information, as permitted by law.

8. To further promote the cooperation of international organizations, specialized agencies, the private sector, and other social actors in the collection and analysis of uniform data on information and communication technologies, as appropriate, with a view to strengthening public policies, including the design of adequate strategies on the use of those technologies.

CITIZEN SECURITY AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

1. To strengthen and promote bilateral, subregional, regional, and international cooperation to prevent and combat violence, corruption, and transnational organized crime in all its forms and manifestations, and to promote institutional strengthening and, where applicable, rehabilitation and social reintegration, within the framework of the international conventions and instruments in force, with full respect for the rule of law, domestic and international law, and human rights, and, to that end, call upon all citizens to participate and lend their support.

2. To continue implementing comprehensive policies, strategies, and actions that seek to prevent crime and insecurity, taking into account links between security and development, as well as to address all causes of violence and promote peaceful coexistence and resolution of disputes among citizens, with special attention to youth and other vulnerable groups.

3. To implement policies containing measures to prevent, investigate, punish, penalize, and eradicate sexual and gender based violence.

4. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of comprehensive public policies on citizen security through actions such as the generation and use of relevant and timely information and the strengthening of the capacity and coordination of institutions that participate in the management of citizen security.

5. To strengthen the system of hemispheric cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime, taking into consideration the economic purpose associated with this phenomenon, through mechanisms that support the strengthening of the necessary national capacities, as appropriate, to confront these threats in a concerted manner, taking advantage of experiences and available resources from existing networks, bodies, and mechanisms, in accordance with international and domestic law.

6. To strengthen the administration of public security by governmental agencies through promotion of citizen and community participation, institutional coordination, and training and education of civilian and police personnel, with full respect for the rule of law, domestic law, gender equality, and human rights.

7. To promote and strengthen citizen and community participation in the promotion and sustainability of citizen security policies and programs.

8. To implement public policies in the realm of citizen security that make the human being their primary focus, within a framework of democratic order, the rule of law, and observance of human rights.

9. To strengthen our efforts to prevent and fight the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons, particularly of women, children and adolescents, and to promote cooperation among states to that end, respecting and fully protecting their human rights.